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ABSTRACT 
A remarkable yet seldom noted set of parallels exists between mod-
ern U.S. bank regulation, on the one hand, and what used to be gar-
den-variety American corporate law, on the other hand. For example, just 
as bank charters are matters not of right but of conditional privilege even 
today, so were all corporate charters not long ago. Just as chartered banks 
are authorized to engage only in limited, enumerated activities even to-
day, so were all corporations restricted not long ago. And just as banks 
are subject to strict capital regulation even today, so were all corpora-
tions not long ago. 
In this Symposium Article, we argue that these parallels are not 
merely curious accidents but a reflection of certain foundational dynam-
ics embedded in, and constitutive of, the corporate form itself. Tracing 
the history of the incorporated American firm, we argue that the corpora-
tion is an inherently hybrid public–private entity—an institutionalized 
and conditional outsourcing to private parties of certain essentially public 
powers and functions. In effect, it is a form of public–private “franchise” 
arrangement in which the public is the franchisor and private parties col-
lectively serve as the franchisees. 
We examine the reasons both for the gradual weakening of this 
original franchise arrangement as a matter of American corporate law 
and policy, and for its continuing presence as a matter of bank regulation. 
We suggest that the “special” salience of banks’ role as public fran-
chisees helps to account for the resilience of the original corporate set-
tlement in U.S. bank regulation. Finally, we consider the normative and 
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practical implications of reviving the “forgotten” franchise view of the 
corporation more generally and, in the spirit of intellectual experiment, 
tentatively outline some possibilities for reintroducing public interest-
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Commercial banks are unlike most other American business firms: 
they are privately owned corporations in a market-capitalist economy, 
yet they are explicitly backed, intrusively regulated, and, when they nev-
ertheless fail, expeditiously liquidated by the federal government.1 In 
these important respects, banks are undeniably “special,” and widely 
recognized to be so.2 However, banks also are “special” in a deeper, 
                                                            
 1. See infra Part II.A. 
 2. There is a reason for the quotes surrounding the word “special.” “Banks are special” is a sort 
of mantra, a familiar and well-worn phrase-of-art, in bank-regulatory circles. A canonical treatment 
of the idea can be found in E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, in FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
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more far-reaching, and constitutive sense, as the most salient living em-
bodiment of a particular understanding of the business corporation. They 
amount to a vestige of what might be called the original American corpo-
rate settlement that established the boundary between private and public 
interests in the management of large-scale productive enterprise.3 
Several surprisingly extensive parallels exist between modern U.S. 
bank regulation, on the one hand, and what used to be garden-variety 
American corporation law until the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, on the other hand.4 Just as bank charters are matters not of right 
but of conditional privilege even today, for example, so were corporate 
charters more generally not long ago.5 Moreover, as chartered banks en-
joy only limited, enumerated powers beyond which they may not stray 
even today, so were corporations more generally restricted not long ago.6 
And just as banks are subject to strict capital regulation even today, so 
were all corporations not long ago.7 
These remarkable yet seldom remarked parallels raise intriguing 
and important questions. Are these parallels merely curious accidents or 
is there a more systematic explanation that accounts for them? If the lat-
ter is true, then why did the originally shared characteristics ultimately 
fall by the wayside for general corporations but not for incorporated 
banks? And what further positive and normative implications might be 
drawn from the answers to these questions? Might bank regulation bear 
lessons concerning the nature and proper regulation of the modern corpo-
ration—or vice versa? 
In this Symposium Article, we address these potentially 
far-reaching questions. Our answers are necessarily tentative and incom-
plete at this point, as the issues involved are not only objectively com-
                                                                                                                                     
MINNEAPOLIS ANNUAL REPORT (1983) [hereinafter Corrigan, Are Banks Special?], available at 
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/annual-reports/are-banks-special; see also E. Gerald 
Corrigan, Are Banks Special? A Revisitation, THE REGION, Mar. 2000, available at 
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/the-region/are-banks-special. In this Article, we inten-
tionally play on this insider mantra by recasting banks’ much-discussed “specialness” in an unaccus-
tomed light. 
 3. It is not our argument that U.S. bank regulation is the sole remaining vestige of the original 
American corporate settlement. Other subspecies of corporation—e.g., insurance companies and 
certain public utilities—might also be characterized, at least in some aspects, as “special” remnants 
of the old regime. In this Article, however, we focus on U.S. commercial banks and bank regulation 
as the most striking, salient, and coherent case of this apparent anachronism. See infra Part II. 
 4. In this Article, we use the term “corporation law” to underscore the Article’s focus on the 
creation and legally recognized formative attributes of a corporate entity, rather than internal gov-
ernance mechanisms and other matters that comprise the bulk of modern American corporate law. 
 5. See infra Parts I–II. 
 6. See infra Parts I–II. 
 7. See infra Parts I–II. 
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plex but also tend to come with considerable theoretical and ideological 
“baggage.” Our aim is not to resolve any long-standing internal debates 
among corporate law scholars, economists, or historians.8 We do offer, 
however, what we believe to be a suggestive thought experiment—an 
effort to synthesize, in an illuminating manner, a multitude of ideas 
found in multiple literatures into a single, coherent, “big picture” view. 
We view the divergent paths taken by American legal and regulato-
ry treatment of banks and non-bank corporations as a valuable natural 
experiment in defining and redefining the boundary between public and 
private in our economy and polity.9 We turn to history to support a spe-
cific interpretation of certain trends in the evolution of the American 
corporate form and our understanding of what that form was, and still is, 
meant to achieve—in each case, from the perspective of public policy 
and the public interest. And, in each case, we use modern bank regula-
tion both as a framing device and as a source of illuminating comparison 
between past and present. 
At the most fundamental level, this comparison highlights the es-
sential role of the state in creating the corporation through the conferral 
of all the constitutive corporate privileges. The most salient of these priv-
ileges are the interlocking and mutually reinforcing attributes of corpo-
rate “personality” separate from constituent personalities, perpetual ex-
istence, and asset segregation—the latter of which includes, but is not 
                                                            
 8. Corporate law and its attendant scholarship present a particularly complicated intellectual 
terrain in this respect. Over many decades, scholars and practitioners of corporate law have spilled—
and continue to spill—a great deal of proverbial ink, if not actual blood, battling over what the cor-
poration is, whose interests it serves or should serve, and what legal and political rights it has or 
should have. There is also a substantial body of scholarship tracing the history and discussing the 
relative merits of various alternative answers to these questions. In the wake of recent controversial 
Supreme Court decisions involving corporations’ First Amendment rights, these issues have once 
again come to figure into intense debates even among constitutional scholars. Reviewing all of the 
multiple strands in this massive literature is a daunting and potentially counterproductive task. We 
accordingly cite to relevant works of individual scholars as appropriate at various points in this Arti-
cle. For a brief sampling of particularly illuminating recent work by corporate law scholars, see, for 
example, Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Or-
ganizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387 (2003); Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth 
Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673 
(2015); Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights: Sepa-
ration of Ownership and Consumption, 123 YALE L.J. 948 (2014); Henry Hansmann et al., Law and 
the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (2006); Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as Time 
Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685 (2015). 
 9. For a short but insightful exposition of the origins and implications of the distinction be-
tween “public” and “private” in American law, see Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Pub-
lic/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423 (1982). 
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exhausted by, limited shareholder liability.10 These corporate privileges 
originally were, both in truth and in explicit statutory and juridical char-
acterization, extraordinary—i.e., not “freely” available as a matter of 
right.11 They were public benefits conditionally conferred upon private 
actors, when such conferral served some public purpose.12 These purpos-
es ceased to be operative when firms acted ultra vires, or outside their 
state-delimited authority,13 thereby forfeiting corporate privileges by vio-
lating the conditions on which they were granted.14 In this sense, the 
nominally privately owned corporation was originally conceived and 
instituted as an inherently public instrumentality.15 In other words, from 
the very beginning, the business corporation amounted to a hybrid insti-
tution, representing the conditional outsourcing to private actors of es-
sentially public powers and functions.16 The public, as represented by the 
                                                            
 10. We discuss these attributes more fully below. See infra Part I. For a thorough overview of 
these corporate attributes and their significance, see, for example, REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE 
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 5–16 (2d ed. 
2009). For a succinct overview of the key characteristics of corporate entities in the context of pre-
vailing alternative theories of the corporation, see Lynn Stout, Corporate Entities: Their Ownership, 
Control, and Purpose, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Francesco Parisi ed., 
forthcoming 2015). Briefly, limited liability and asset segregation are related as species to genus. 
Limited liability protects shareholder assets against corporate creditors in the event of corporate 
insolvency. At the same time, insolvency provisions of the corporate law regime protect corporate 
assets from shareholders’ and other constituents’ creditors. Some distinguished scholars suggest that 
the protection of corporate assets from constituents’ creditors might be more “essential” to corporate 
and other bodies of enterprise-organizational law than are other incidents of corporate privilege, 
including limited liability. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organ-
izational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000). As for the “interlocking” character of all of these attrib-
utes, asset segregation buttresses separate personality, which in turn buttresses perpetual existence 
by enabling the firm to persist through time longer than the lifetime of any particular generation of 
constituents. 
 11. See infra Part I.A. 
 12. See infra Part I.A. 
 13. As a general matter, the ultra vires doctrine prohibits corporations from taking actions 
exceeding their legally enumerated powers, on pain of forfeiting the corporate privileges. See Her-
bert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1662 
(1988). For a brief and accessible explanation of the ultra vires doctrine, see WILLIAM A. KLEIN, 
JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & FRANK PARTNOY, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 155–56 (11th ed. 2010). 
 14. See, e.g., JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 469–79 (1832); Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 1663–64. 
 15. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefits 
Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 277 (2013) (arguing that in early nineteenth-century America, 
“there appears to have been a special correlating of corporateness with public-oriented service of a 
sort that did not exist with business activity more generally”). 
 16. We deliberately focus on the public–private balance within the corporate form, which we 
consider to be the “abidingly crucial issue in corporate legal theory.” See David Millon, Theories of 
the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 202 (1990). Explicitly or implicitly, this distinction remains 
the key dimension in ongoing academic debates “about the nature of corporate activity and the ap-
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sovereign chartering authority, was in this respect acting as a franchisor, 
while those who founded incorporated firms were, in effect, its fran-
chisees.17 This underlying perception of a corporate charter gave rise to 
such terms of art as “the corporate franchise.”18 
We view this dynamic between state and firm not merely as an in-
teresting historical curiosity but as a defining feature built into the foun-
dation of the corporate form itself. No matter how much the face of the 
American corporation has changed since the late nineteenth century, at 
its core, the corporation remains a hybrid public–private entity—a fran-
chisee freely pursuing private profits behind a shield of publicly-granted 
legal privileges, which, in turn, must be justified on public policy 
grounds.19 
This conception of the modern corporation as a public–private fran-
chise stands in marked contrast to currently fashionable economic and 
legal theories that portray corporations as purely private economic ac-
tors—as products simply of private ordering—whose only purpose is the 
pursuit of private gain for their shareholders.20 The contrast is even 
starker when it comes to normative implications. The “private contract” 
                                                                                                                                     
propriate goals of corporate law.” Id. at 201. See also William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Concep-
tion of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261 (1992) (describing the basic public–
private distinction as the dichotomy between the “property conception” and the “social entity con-
ception” of the corporation’s nature and purposes). 
 17. Depending on the legal and historical context, the term “franchise” may refer to any of a 
large number of distinct phenomena. For purposes of our argument, we use the term not in any of 
these specific technical senses but in a more general sense, to refer to an arrangement whereby the 
state, as agent of the public, explicitly confers certain legal rights and privileges upon private enter-
prises, with the expectation that these private enterprises will produce certain public benefits. 
 18. See, e.g., RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION, 
1784–1855: BROADENING THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC SERVICE DURING INDUSTRIALIZATION passim 
(1982); see also infra Parts I–II. 
 19. In a fascinating recent study of the modern corporation as a fundamentally political institu-
tion, political scientist David Ciepley argues that the corporation is properly understood as a “fran-
chise government” that transcends the traditional liberal dichotomy between public and private. See 
David A. Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political Theory of the Corporation, 107 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139, 140 (2013). We find Ciepley’s arguments both persuasive and fundamental-
ly aligned with our own. See supra note 17. 
 20. Perhaps the most emblematic expression of this view is Milton Friedman’s famous asser-
tion that corporate managers’ only “social responsibility” is “to make as much money as possible” 
for the corporation’s shareholders. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to 
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 33. The currently fashionable rendition of 
this perspective is the “nexus of contracts” model of the corporation. For the classic exposition, see 
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Although there are many variants of this 
general approach, the fundamental factor common to them all is their unequivocal assertion of the 
primacy of the private in defining the genesis, nature, and purpose of the corporation. We shall ac-
cordingly refer to this view as a “private contract” conception of the corporation. 
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conception of the corporation generally views public regulation of corpo-
rate activities as a presumptively illegitimate outside interference with 
the corporate form, except where particular firms impose externalities 
upon others.21 By contrast, this Article’s “franchise” view of the corpo-
rate form explicitly recognizes the public’s fundamental and ineluctable 
role in defining certain fundamental parameters of corporate activity as 
conditions for the public granting of extraordinary corporate privileges, 
and its right to enforce such conditions through close regulation.22 The 
corporation, in this view, is a hybrid entity that represents a mutualistic 
arrangement—an institutionalized “bargain” or “settlement”—between 
the citizenry as a whole, on the one hand, and smaller groups of profit-
seeking citizens, on the other hand.23 
This view of the corporation used to be common. Since the late 
nineteenth and, especially, the early twentieth century, however, the orig-
inal conception of the private corporation as a vessel of particularized 
public interest has gradually faded from public consciousness.24 We ar-
gue that this phenomenon is best understood in light of the genesis of the 
American corporation as a state-created tool of outsourcing infrastructure 
and industrial development, which was necessary under conditions of 
capital scarcity and still-incipient political government during the early 
                                                            
 21. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 
88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 183 (1985); Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 1601. 
 22. In this sense, we build upon what sometimes is called the old “concession” theory of the 
corporation, which highlighted the fact that corporations derive their defining powers and privileges 
from, and thus are ultimately constituted by, the state. The concession conception of the corporation 
receded with the proliferation of highly permissive general incorporation laws in the late nineteenth 
century, as discussed below. See infra Part I. Despite being routinely and seemingly ritually dis-
missed as “obsolete” and “statist,” the concession view of the corporation offers a critical insight 
into the inherently public–private character of the corporate form, a character not expunged simply 
by interpreting a firm as a “nexus of contracts.” Separate personality, perpetual existence, and asset 
segregation—particularly where tort liabilities are concerned—cannot be contracted for, but have to 
be conferred by the state. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 10. For more on the original con-
cession theory of the corporation, see Horwitz, supra note 21, at 181–82; William W. Bratton, Jr., 
The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 433–35 
(1989). See generally infra Part I. 
 23. Erik Orts identifies three major legal theories of business enterprise: (1) the concession 
theory that, in his view, represents a “top-down perspective of the political state”; (2) the participant 
theory that represents a clear “bottom-up perspective of individual people who aggregate together 
within a firm”; and (3) an institutional theory that “sees firms as socially established entities that are 
both authorized and recognized by governments and organized and managed by individual partici-
pants.” ERIK W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 12–14 (2013). Our view 
of the corporation as a public–private hybrid can be characterized as a variant of Orts’ intermediate 
“institutional” position. 
 24. See sources cited supra notes 21–22; see also infra Part I. 
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national era in the United States.25 As the financing needs of large-scale 
national development and industrialization grew, accelerating accumula-
tion of private capital became an increasingly important public policy 
priority.26 To the extent that special corporate privileges—separate per-
sonality, perpetual existence, and asset segregation (including limited 
liability)—spared skittish private capital the risk of excessive loss, at-
tachment, or premature liquidation in the event of projects gone awry, 
making incorporation widely and easily available served the paramount 
objective of industrial development.27 The proliferation of what we call 
“ultra-general” state incorporation laws in the second half of the nine-
teenth century was, in effect, a policy of promoting industrialization un-
der conditions of scarce public and private capital.28 
At the macro-level, the principal public benefits of this policy were 
twofold: unlocking new channels of large-scale capital accumulation and 
democratizing access to economic opportunity.29 Its long-term price, 
however, was a significant retreat of the state, and hence of the public, as 
the sovereign franchisor of the “hybrid” corporate form. Once corporate 
privileges became “freely” available without any commitment on the part 
of the private enterprise—either explicit or implied—to deliver public 
benefits, the optics of the corporation changed dramatically. Under the 
new regime of “free incorporation,” both the role of the state as the fran-
chisor and the inherent public–private hybridity of the corporation be-
came increasingly invisible. Today, the result is a nearly complete tri-
umph of neoliberal, antistatist, antiregulatory ideas in corporate law, the-
ory, and policy. 
Such has not been the case in the regulation, and associated history, 
of banks. While corporations were being “freed” from state-imposed 
                                                            
 25. See infra Part I. We use the term “infrastructure” to refer to something broader than merely 
the familiar forms encountered in contemporary textbooks on public finance. In addition to commu-
nications, transport, water, and schools, for example, our conception includes such goods as social 
safety nets, libraries, and even efforts affirmatively to change a new nation’s comparative advantage 
in national and global markets—e.g., from primarily agricultural to commercial and industrial. For 
additional discussion of this more capacious understanding of infrastructure and our reasons for 
favoring it, see Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Public Actors in Private Markets: Toward a 
Developmental Finance State, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
 26. See infra Part I.C. 
 27. See infra Part I.C. 
 28. We are, of course, aware of the multiple alternative explanations and additional political 
and administrative factors that shaped the historical shift from special chartering to general incorpo-
ration statutes of the type that prevail today. For a more extensive discussion of these factors, see 
infra Part I.C. For more on the meaning of “general” and “ultra-general” in connection with incorpo-
ration laws, see infra note 41 and accompanying text, as well as Part I generally. 
 29. For more on the role of the democratization rationale, see infra note 93 and accompanying 
text. 
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controls and conditions, U.S. banks remained subject to the original set-
tlement and, to a great extent, remain subject to it even today.30 For ex-
ample, access to bank charters is still subject to strict public control and 
explicit conditions on banks’ business activities, and violations of these 
conditions can still lead to charter revocation.31 Most familiar explana-
tions for why banks are “special” tend to focus on their unique access to 
explicit public subsidies, including federal deposit insurance and central 
bank liquidity back-up.32 While pointing to the most visible and political-
ly salient forms of public support for banks, these explanations paint an 
incomplete picture. As history shows, banks were subject to a restrictive 
regime of “special chartering” long before the emergence of a ful-
ly-functional Federal Reserve System or the creation of the federal de-
posit insurance scheme during the New Deal era. Unlike most other 
businesses, banking was excluded from the nationwide move toward 
“free incorporating” in the later part of the nineteenth century.33 Thus, 
there must be deeper, more pervasive reasons for the special treatment of 
banking corporations. 
This remarkable resilience of the original corporate settlement in 
banking is fully consistent with—and, in fact, lends significant support 
to—the franchise conception of the corporation. The reasons for continu-
ity in bank regulation are fundamentally rooted in the more visibly hy-
brid, public–private nature of the banking business, making a bank’s 
“specialness” as a corporate entity more a matter of degree than of prin-
ciple.34 Unlike other corporations, banks manifestly function as specially 
privileged franchisees dispensing a unique public resource—the full faith 
and credit of the United States, as administered by its central bank, the 
Federal Reserve System.35 Because legislators, regulators, and even the 
general public remain at least intuitively aware of banks’ essentially pub-
                                                            
 30. See infra Part II.A. 
 31. See infra Part II.A. In discussing the vestigial character of contemporary U.S. bank regula-
tion in this Article, we do not express an opinion as to its practical efficacy or success as a matter of 
financial stability. As the most recent financial crisis demonstrated, regulatory controls do not guar-
antee that private profit-seeking in the financial services industry can never cause significant public 
harm. 
 32. See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: MOVING FROM 
LIQUIDITY- TO GROWTH-DRIVEN MARKETS 101–32 (2014), available at http://www.imf.org/ 
External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2014/01/pdf/text.pdf. 
 33. See infra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 34. See infra Part II.B. 
 35. See infra Part II.B. We develop a broader interpretive framework that both illuminates and 
substantiates this assertion in a separate project. See Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The 
Finance Franchise (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
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lic function, the old corporate settlement continues visibly to exist in 
their case. 
Moreover, this settlement’s continuing existence at the very heart of 
the modern American capitalist system defies claims that public control 
over business corporations generally—that is, the original incorporation 
regime—is obsolete, invariably inefficient, or inherently incompatible 
with that system.36 Banks may be different from “regular” corporations 
today, but they are very much alive and well: in fact, the U.S. banking 
industry currently commands an unprecedented amount of wealth, and 
large banks’ balance sheets dwarf those of most non-bank firms.37 So, if 
this particular incarnation of the original franchise model of the corpora-
tion is able to grow and generate profits, why is the model so easily—
indeed, almost automatically—presumed dead? Such a presumption is 
neither fair nor accurate. 
In fact, under today’s conditions of capital abundance and mature 
systems of national government, it might well be desirable to reestablish 
some updated rendition of the original corporate settlement that explicit-
ly reflects a mutually beneficial public–private bargain. In this Article, 
we begin outlining some of the possibilities for reintroducing a few fairly 
modest but explicit conditions on currently unconditionally granted cor-
porate privileges.38 We remain fully aware of potential challenges and 
difficulties associated with this effort.39 Not only does it raise a wide 
range of complex practical issues of design and implementation, but it 
also cuts against some of the core assumptions underlying contemporary 
corporate law doctrine. Our present goal, however, is not to develop a 
                                                            
 36. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993). 
 37. For example, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., reported almost $2 trillion in total assets as of 
June 30, 2015. See JPMorgan Chase Bank: Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income for a 
Bank with Domestic and Foreign Offices – FFIEC 031, FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, 
https://cdr.ffiec.gov/Public/ViewFacsimileDirect.aspx?ds=call&idType=fdiccert&id=628&date=063
02015 (last updated Sept. 18, 2015). For comparison, Exxon Mobil’s total assets, at the end of 2014, 
were slightly below $350 billion. See XOM Company Financials, NASDAQ, 
http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/xom/financials?query=balance-sheet (last visited Sept. 29, 2015). 
Of course, the fact that U.S. banks have such huge balance sheets does not mean they are inherently 
superior to, less risk-prone, or better managed than non-bank corporations. On the contrary, big 
banks’ size may be viewed as both a symptom and a cause of certain systemic vulnerabilities and 
dysfunctions in the financial services sector. Modern banking and its regulation present many chal-
lenges and are far from being problem-free, or perfectly “well” in any substantive sense. In the con-
text of the present discussion, our aim is simply to point out that the resilience of the old corporate 
settlement in banking did not preclude the growth of large-scale, profitable, privately owned banking 
firms. 
 38. See infra Part III. 
 39. For fuller discussion of some of these challenges, see infra Part III.C. 
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grand new theory or a legislative blueprint, but rather to broaden our col-
lective imagination in search of a better balance between public and pri-
vate interests, both in our economy and in our polity. 
To this end, the Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly examines 
the genesis, original function, and subsequent evolution of the corporate 
form in the United States. Part II analyzes modern U.S. bank regulation 
as a vestigial case of the original view of the corporation as a public–
private franchise. Part III discusses the broader normative implications of 
reviving the franchise view and tentatively outlines our take on how that 
view could potentially be reinvigorated and reapplied in practice—and 
what principal challenges are likely to arise on that path. 
I. THE “CORPORATE FRANCHISE”: WHAT IT ONCE WAS 
A. The Extraordinary Nature of Corporate Privilege 
The idea that one might charter a separate, asset-owning, and per-
petually existing corporation, and that owners of that corporation might 
avoid personal liabilities—all for no nobler purpose than simply “to 
make money” for oneself—has been part of the American business land-
scape for so long now that hardly anyone pauses to wonder whether 
things were always so.40 Yet, the answer here is quite clear: things were 
not always so. Indeed, the advent of the cross-categorical general incor-
poration law, pursuant to which incorporation and attendant liability 
limitations could be had for any purpose whatsoever, dates back only to 
the end of the nineteenth century.41 Prior to that, corporate privileges 
                                                            
 40. This common assumption finds ideal expression in a well-known provision of Delaware 
law stating that a firm may be incorporated “to conduct or promote any lawful business or purpos-
es.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2013). 
 41. See SEAVOY, supra note 18, at 6–7, 191–254; see also Ronald E. Seavoy, The Public Ser-
vice Origins of the American Business Corporation, 52 BUS. HIST. REV. 30 (1978). Seavoy’s focus 
is principally upon developments in the State of New York, which he (reasonably, in our view) takes 
to be emblematic of developments across the United States. For studies that reach similar results to 
those of Seavoy in other U.S. jurisdictions see, for example, JOHN WILLIAM CADMAN, THE 
CORPORATION IN NEW JERSEY: BUSINESS AND POLITICS, 1791–1875 (1949); EDWARD MERRICK 
DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO 
MASSACHUSETTS (1954). For similar takes on the development of the corporate form in the U.K., 
see, for example, RONALD RALPH FORMOY, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN COMPANY 
LAW (1923); BISHOP CARLETON HUNT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN 
ENGLAND, 1800–1867 (1936). 
 A brief word on terminology is in order. The term “general” in “general corporation law” re-
fers to the absence of any need for a separate legislative act to charter a particular firm. In other 
words, it implies that the legislature that has passed the law in question has delegated the individual 
firm-chartering decision to an administrative officer such as a secretary of state. The first such laws 
were not “general” in the sense of making incorporation available for any purpose whatever. The 
first general incorporation laws, indeed, were passed in connection with firms devoted to specific 
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were available only for projects with manifestly public purposes, and 
often only on condition that legislatures (or their appointed administra-
tive agents) could verify that the incorporators actually pursued the 
promised projects.42 
It is not difficult to appreciate why, in those earlier times, corporate 
privileges would have been the exception and not the rule. Nor is it diffi-
cult to discern the bases on which such exceptions would have first come 
to be made. The separate and perpetual existence of a business firm, un-
derstood as something over and apart from its owners or principal con-
stituents, would have marked a significant departure from the earlier law 
of partnership, pursuant to which firms ceased to exist the moment that 
even one constituent left the firm or violated its constitutive documents.43 
By the same token, the first steps toward legal segregation of constituent 
assets from firm assets was formally recognized to be an innovation, via 
the development of what courts forthrightly called a new property 
form—the so-called tenancy in partnership.44 
As for that form of asset segregation now known as limited share-
holder liability, such a privilege is per se exceptional in any legal system 
that values and vindicates responsibility and accountability—i.e., liabil-
ity. The entirety of the law of civil obligation—in particular, contract and 
tort law—is predicated on liability.45 Contract law enables one citizen to 
hold another citizen responsible for his or her promises, provided that 
these were bargained for or have induced reasonable reliance on the part 
of another.46 Tort law enables one citizen to hold another citizen respon-
sible for the harms he or she directly or indirectly causes to others by 
acting intentionally, recklessly, or negligently.47 In both cases, accounta-
bility—hence potential liability—is of the very essence of the body of 
law in question. It is what the law is for.48 
These facts of our law hold true even when defendants have acted 
in concert with others, including by financing others’ harmful or prohib-
                                                                                                                                     
purposes such as the construction of turnpikes, wharves, and canals. See infra notes 64–76 and ac-
companying text. 
 42. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 8; see also ERNST FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF 
CORPORATIONS (Batoche Books 2000) (1897); JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS (1917). 
 43. For an overview of the potential causes of dissolution, see, canonically, UNIF. 
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31 (1914). 
 44. See id. §§ 24–28 for a historical overview of the property rights of a partner. 
 45. See, e.g., JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, 
CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 7–32 (2006). 
 46. See, e.g., id. at 289–388. 
 47. See, e.g., id. at 159–263. 
 48. See, e.g., id. at 7–32. 
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ited actions. One does not escape potential liability for burning a home or 
a business, for example, merely by doing so as part of a mob, or by 
knowingly supplying the funds that mob members employ to buy torches 
or accelerants.49 Indeed, liability in such cases is “joint and several” 
where the law of civil obligation is concerned, and falls under the sweep-
ingly broad category of “conspiracy” where the criminal law is con-
cerned.50 Yet this link between act and consequence is precisely what 
corporate shareholders’ limited liability severs.51 It limits one’s possible 
losses, under appropriate circumstances, to no more than the equity capi-
tal one put into an enterprise, irrespective of what harms one remotely or 
proximately facilitates in financing that enterprise.52 
Why would so extraordinary a set of privileges—separate and per-
petual firm existence, asset segregation in general, and limited liability in 
particular—ever have been conceived, let alone granted?53 While a full 
answer to this question is bound to be multilayered and multifaceted, the 
                                                            
 49. See, e.g., id. at 159–263. 
 50. “Joint and several” liability falls upon any number of those responsible for a particular 
injury, such that a successful plaintiff can sue any one or more of those responsible for her harm. 
Successfully sued parties then have to sue other responsible parties for contribution or indemnifica-
tion. See Joint and Several Liability, WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY & ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.law. 
cornell.edu/wex/joint_and_several_liability (last visited Sept. 29, 2015). “Conspiracy,” a.k.a. “Pink-
erton” liability, is a rough counterpart in criminal law, pursuant to which those who intentionally 
assist in the planning or execution of a crime, or predicate offense, can be found criminally liable 
even in circumstances where they do not commit the predicate offense themselves. See Pinkerton 
Liability, WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY & ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/pinkerton 
_liability (last visited Sept. 29, 2015). 
 51. As David Ciepley argues, “a corporate economy is, literally, an institutionalization of indi-
vidual economic irresponsibility.” Ciepley, supra note 19, at 147. 
 52. See, e.g., ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability 
for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991). For more on the cost-externalizing effects of cor-
porate limited liability see, for example, Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate 
Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573 (1986); George W. Dent, Jr., Limited Liability in Environmental Law, 26 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 151 (1991); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and 
the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985); Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlim-
ited Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387 (1992); David W. Leebron, Limited 
Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565 (1991). 
 53. Scholars of corporate law might note here that a general consensus exists in their field as to 
the reasons for granting limited liability, the key reason being the need to avoid discouraging 
wealthy individuals from making risky investments. For a brief exposition of that consensus see, for 
example, William J. Carney, Limited Liability, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 659, 
670–71 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). Rather than contesting this 
well-established shareholder-centric view, we aim to supplement it by widening our lens beyond the 
interests of individual investors and examining the broader public rationale for conferring limited 
liability. Why should it be thought publicly beneficial to encourage privately accumulated wealth to 
flow voluntarily toward risky investments? Expanding the explanatory focus in this way offers po-
tentially important new insights and suggests new policy possibilities. See infra Part III. 
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core explanation appears to be rooted in the needs of the nation’s eco-
nomic development at the time.54 Under circumstances in which capital 
is scarce and yet must be mobilized for lengthy periods of time for large 
public infrastructural and industrial projects, and in which government 
lacks the capacity to mobilize and deploy the necessary capital itself, 
affording special privileges to private suppliers of capital and their asso-
ciations can naturally look attractive.55 It is one obvious means of public-
ly encouraging the private capitalization of projects that bear public sig-
nificance when the public itself is not optimally capable of so doing and 
when private options are significantly limited.56 In this sense, the corpo-
ration can be viewed as a means of outsourcing to private parties the task 
of critical public investment.57  So long as the firm does, in fact, invest in 
public projects, the grant of canonical corporate privileges would appear 
warranted. Where the firm strays from the purposes originally warranting 
corporate privilege, however, the purpose of the firm will in effect have 
been abandoned. Under such circumstances, one might expect that the 
firm will be deemed to have acted ultra vires, its shareholders’ corporate 
privileges accordingly having been abused and in consequence forfeit-
ed.58 
This seems to be largely how things actually worked in late eight-
eenth- and then nineteenth-century America.59 Deployable wealth had 
not yet accumulated in abundance during the colonial and early national 
periods, nor did significant state or federal capacity exist to accumulate 
and deploy capital.60 This was particularly true with respect to the federal 
                                                            
 54. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Responsibil-
ity: Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1153–54 (2012) (arguing that a for-profit 
corporation was viewed as an ideal legal and business vehicle for promoting industrial growth in 
nineteenth-century America). 
 55. For the case of New York see, for example, SEAVOY, supra note 18, at 3–7 and passim. For 
New Jersey, see CADMAN, supra note 41, at 3–83. For Massachusetts, see DODD, supra note 41, at 
44–46, 158–63, 226–65, 349–54. See also JOHN LAURITZ LARSON, INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT: 
NATIONAL PUBLIC WORKS AND THE PROMISE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE EARLY UNITED 
STATES (2001). 
 56. See sources cited supra note 55. 
 57. See, e.g., Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corpora-
tion, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 22 (1945) (“At its origin in Massachusetts the corporation was conceived as 
an agency of government, endowed with public attributes, exclusive privileges, and political power, 
and designed to serve a social function for the state. Turnpikes, not trade, banks, not land specula-
tion, were its province because the community, not the enterprising capitalists, marked out its sphere 
of activity.”). 
 58. See sources cited supra notes 13–14. 
 59. See sources cited supra note 41. 
 60. See sources cited supra note 41; see also LARSON, supra note 55; Robert E. Wright, Rise of 
the Corporation Nation, in FOUNDING CHOICES: AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1790S 217 
(Douglas A. Irwin & Richard Sylla eds., 2011), which is informative, if a bit triumphalist. 
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government once President Andrew Jackson vetoed legislation that 
would have renewed the charter of the nation’s de facto infrastructure 
bank, the Second Bank of the United States.61 As a result, individual 
states resorted to offering corporate status to firms organized with infra-
structure projects in view.62 The full story can be helpfully divided into 
several distinct, if unavoidably stylized, historical phases.63 
B. The Evolution of the Corporate Form in the United States: From 
“Franchise” to “Free Incorporation” 
The first phase in the evolution of the American corporation, com-
mencing during the late colonial era and continuing into the early nation-
al period, saw colonial, then state, legislatures individually chartering 
specific corporate organizations for a quite limited number of specific 
purposes. These first incorporated organizations were primarily munici-
palities, educational and charitable (a.k.a. “benevolent”) institutions, and 
certain partnerships that provided commercially salient public infrastruc-
ture like wharves.64 The second phase saw the widespread enactment of 
“general” incorporation statutes—i.e., statutes delegating the chartering 
function from legislatures to administrative functionaries—for institu-
tions of the same general type: municipalities, religious congregations, 
educational institutions and libraries, medical societies, and the like.65 
The key benefit of incorporation for these nonbusiness entities was an 
explicit recognition of their legal right collectively to own property, such 
as land, in the name of the entity itself, and to assert their collective 
property and contractual rights in court.66 
                                                            
 61. For New York, see SEAVOY, supra note 18, at xi-xii, 105, and passim. For New Jersey, see 
CADMAN, supra note 41, at ix–xiv, 3–83. For the United States generally, see DODD, supra note 41, 
at 3–9, 11–65, 123–88. For Massachusetts, see DODD, supra note 41, at 195–441. For more on the 
significance of a central bank for purposes of public mobilization of capital for infrastructure and 
other public projects in early America, see, for example, Hockett & Omarova, supra note 25. 
 62. See sources cited supra note 41. 
 63. Phases here largely track the “stages” proposed in SEAVOY, supra note 18, at 5–7. Seavoy 
himself notes that the boundaries between these stages are not altogether hard-and-fast, particularly 
given the different rates at which differing states entered into and passed through them. See id. at 7 
(“In this whole development, there were many overlappings, so that these categories are not con-
secutive for any once class of corporation in any one state.”). 
 64. For New York, see, for example, SEAVOY, supra note 18, at 3–4, 9–38. For New Jersey, 
see CADMAN, supra note 41, at 3–83. For the United States generally and Massachusetts particular-
ly, see DODD, supra note 41, at 44–45, 158–63, 226–65, 349–54. 
 65. For New York, see, for example, SEAVOY, supra note 18, at 9–38. For New Jersey, see 
CADMAN, supra note 41, at 3–83. For the United States generally and Massachusetts particularly, 
see DODD, supra note 41, at 265–66, 354–61. 
 66. See sources cited supra notes 64–65. 
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The third phase saw the widespread enactment of “general” regula-
tory statutes.67 These laws were “general” and “regulatory” in the sense 
that they enumerated in single-fell-swoops all of the powers and limita-
tions attending specific named types of corporations, while still requiring 
that legislatures authorize individual charters on a firm-by-firm basis.68 
The kinds of firm to which these statutes applied were almost uniformly 
devoted to the construction of so-called internal improvements, such as 
commercially salient public infrastructures, and were suggestively la-
beled “franchise corporations.”69 Partly for this reason, and partly be-
cause these “franchise corporations” typically enjoyed toll-collecting and 
eminent domain powers, in addition to limited liability and other corpo-
rate privileges,70 legislatures granted them charters only after public 
hearings at which the public need and desirability of any such firm could 
be thoroughly vetted.71 
The fourth phase in the development of the American corporate 
form brought “general” incorporation statutes of the kind first developed 
for “benevolent” organizations to “franchise corporations” as well, at 
least where they did not compete in spheres of activity already occupied 
by sole proprietorships and partnerships.72 Legislatures, in other words, 
began delegating charter decisions to administrative functionaries as they 
had previously done in the case of religious and charitable corporations.73 
At the same time, the class of “public service” functions recognized by 
such statutes gradually broadened to include more overtly profitable un-
dertakings. This was the case where clear public benefits continued to 
accompany the private benefits, which were sought by constituents of 
such firms.74 Examples included telegraph, railroad, gas, and then elec-
                                                            
 67. For New York, see, for example, SEAVOY, supra note 18, at 5, 39–52. For New Jersey, see 
CADMAN, supra note 41, at 3–83. For the United States in general and Massachusetts in particular, 
see DODD, supra note 41, at 265–66, 354–61. 
 68. See sources cited supra note 67. 
 69. See sources cited supra note 67; LARSON, supra note 55. 
 70. See sources cited supra note 67; LARSON, supra note 55. The delegation of the state’s 
eminent domain powers to private corporations set up to build much-needed roads and canals was a 
particularly vivid manifestation of these corporations’ role as public instrumentalities. 
 71. Scholars and practitioners of banking law will immediately recognize a striking similarity 
here to the substantive and procedural form that bank-chartering decisions continue to take today. 
For a discussion of bank chartering, see infra Part II.A. 
 72. For New York, see, for example, SEAVOY, supra note 18, at 6, 53–236. For New Jersey, 
see CADMAN, supra note 41, at 3–201. For the United States generally and Massachusetts particular-
ly, see DODD, supra note 41, at 265–66, 354–61. 
 73. For the meaning of “general” in the present connection, see supra note 41. 
 74. For New York, see, for example, SEAVOY, supra note 18, at 5, 39–52. For New Jersey, see 
CADMAN, supra note 41, at 3–201. For Massachusetts in particular and New England more general-
ly, see DODD, supra note 41, at 364–437. 
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tric lighting firms, as well as banks, insurance companies, and mutual 
loan firms.75 However, as the web of proposed legislatively recognizable 
“public services” grew, political controversy predictably began to attend 
the process of drafting and enacting general incorporation statutes.76 
These controversies were ultimately resolved at the end of the nine-
teenth century by the proliferation of what might be called “ultra-
general” incorporation statutes, which permitted incorporation for more 
or less any lawful purpose.77 By the early twentieth century, these stat-
utes effectively rendered the corporate form freely, easily, and uncondi-
tionally available to all who sought its benefits. This principle of “free 
incorporation” defines the fifth phase of American corporate law devel-
opment, amidst which we live to this day.78 
C. The Demise of the Franchise View: Some Explanations 
This brief overview of American corporate evolution reveals a cru-
cial dynamic that tends to be overlooked in contemporary discussions of 
the corporation. The critical—and now almost universally ignored—
point is that in all phases before the fifth phase, strict conditions attached 
to the granting of limited liability and other corporate privileges.79 Firms 
had to state their particular public purposes in their charters and then hew 
to those purposes in pursuit of their activities.80 Legislatures, and later 
public administrators, had to charter every firm separately, and acted—
partly through public hearings, partly through reporting requirements—to 
ensure that particular incorporated firms were publicly necessary and 
                                                            
 75. See sources cited supra note 74. 
 76. See sources cited supra note 74. 
 77. For the case of New York, see SEAVOY, supra note 18, at 6–7, 177–230, 266–74. For New 
Jersey, see CADMAN, supra note 41, at 3–201. For Massachusetts in particular and New England 
more generally, see DODD, supra note 41, at 364–437. 
 78. It is possible to argue, however, that the relatively recent proliferation of limited liability 
partnership variants—such as the limited liability company (LLC) and limited liability partnership 
(LLP), both of which allow for limited liability without exacting the public-benefitting quid pro quo 
of “double taxation”—properly marks the beginning of the sixth phase in this historical process. 
During the 1980s, firms of professionals such as doctors, lawyers, accountants, and others, citing a 
putative “liability crisis,” began lobbying state legislatures to recognize new business-organizational 
forms that combined the pass-through taxation advantages of the general partnership business form 
with the limited liability advantages of the corporate form. The limited partnership form, available 
long before 1980, did not quite fit the bill because it required passivity on the part of the limited 
partner in return for limited liability status—a condition incompatible with active participation in 
running the firm on the part of practicing doctors, lawyers, etc. Ultimately, these lobbying efforts 
paid off as states began introducing new “hybrid” species of business form, including the LLC and 
LLP forms. For more on the history of these developments see, for example, WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET 
AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 121–35 (4th ed. 2012). 
 79. See supra notes 64–76 and accompanying text. 
 80. See supra notes 64–76 and accompanying text. 
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abided by the terms of their charters.81 Firms also had to maintain capital 
buffers to minimize the chance that any creditors would be harmed by 
the moral hazard dangers occasioned by limited shareholder liability.82 
Violations of these conditions were considered abuses of the corporate 
form, or deeds ultra vires (i.e., outside of the firms’ legitimate powers), 
and accordingly brought forfeiture of the limited liability shield and other 
corporate privileges enjoyed by the firm and its shareholders.83 
All of these characteristics of the corporation law regime until the 
late nineteenth century combined to make plain why many corporations 
were considered, and typically called, “franchises” throughout this peri-
od.84 Most corporations, even when not municipal but privately owned, 
were treated essentially as public franchisees. They were creatures of the 
public, created and empowered to act, in significant measure, on behalf 
of the public.85 In effect, they were privately financed, and privately 
profiting, public agents.86 What, then, changed in the later-nineteenth 
century? How did the franchise character of the corporation, and with it 
the conditionality of corporate privileges, come to dissipate and eventual-
ly disappear?87 
The answer appears to be in part innocent, and in part sordid. The 
innocent element of the explanation lies in the interplay among three key 
sets of factors: economic, political, and administrative. The needs of in-
dustrialization under conditions of capital scarcity provided the funda-
mental economic impetus for deep change in the incorporation regime in 
the later part of the nineteenth century.88 This was a time when large, 
capital-intensive industries began growing and proliferating throughout 
                                                            
 81. See supra notes 64–76 and accompanying text. As one scholar described it, each special 
charter was essentially “a private bill creating the particular corporation,” which “outlined the corpo-
ration’s terms and conditions, such as authorized capital and permitted activities, applicable to that 
individual corporation, and in certain circumstances granted special privileges such as monopoly and 
eminent domain rights.” Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continua-
tion of Willard Hurst’s Study of Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 85 (1999). 
 82. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 78, at 141. In general, moral hazard arises because share-
holders, whose potential losses (but not gains) are capped, are incentivized to push the corporation 
they control to take excess risks in hopes of excess returns. 
 83. See sources cited supra notes 13–14. 
 84. See, e.g., DODD, supra note 41, at 349–59, 435; LARSON, supra note 55; SEAVOY, supra 
note 18, passim. 
 85. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 54, at 1144–45. 
 86. See Handlin & Handlin, supra note 57, at 22–23. 
 87. Or, as Seavoy might put it, what accounts for “the transfer of the public service function 
from benevolent corporations (primarily religious congregations and academies) to internal im-
provement corporations (turnpikes and bridges) to business corporations that exploited an anony-
mous market (manufactories)”? See SEAVOY, supra note 18, at 7. 
 88. See Johnson, supra note 54. 
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the country, and their growth generated demand for new financing chan-
nels.89 Making long-term equity investing easier and less risky was a 
readily available means of satisfying this demand and encouraging the 
accumulation of capital on a more massive scale. Crucially, the corporate 
form made it possible to segregate and lock in productive assets neces-
sary to undertake large-scale, specialized projects with lifespans longer 
than those of single generations of investors.90 
Accelerating industrial growth also put new pressures on the still 
underdeveloped administrative capacities of individual states. In the se-
cond half of the nineteenth century, it became increasingly difficult for 
legislatures to incorporate every firm separately, rather than in a plenary 
fashion through the operation of general incorporation laws.91 It also be-
came more difficult to parse out and specify with particular precision 
what benefits yielded by industrialization were “public” in character and 
which were “merely private.”92 It accordingly grew more difficult to de-
cide precisely which corporate acts were ultra vires and which were not, 
which increasingly problematized the viability of the ultra vires doctrine 
itself. In light of these challenges and the resulting administrative over-
load, simplifying the process of incorporation and lightening the burden 
of regulatory oversight were rational responses on the part of over-
whelmed state governments. 
Finally, there appears to have been an understandable ideological 
element—a clamoring for the democratization of corporate privilege—at 
work in the move toward what this Article labels “ultra-general” incorpo-
ration statutes. Aspiring entrepreneurs and would-be investors, who plau-
sibly viewed some grants of corporate privilege as cases of cronyism 
among government and economic elites, began demanding equal access 
to corporate privileges, and democratic legislatures increasingly respond-
ed to these demands.93 In this respect, the move toward ultra-general in-
                                                            
 89. For the case of New York see, for example, SEAVOY, supra note 18, at 6–7, 177–230, 255–
74. For New Jersey, see CADMAN, supra note 41, at 111–201. For Massachusetts in particular and 
New England more generally, see DODD, supra note 41, at 364–437. 
 90. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 8, at 687–88. 
 91. See sources cited supra note 89. 
 92. See sources cited supra note 89. 
 93. See sources cited supra note 89; see also Howard Bodenhorn, Bank Chartering and Politi-
cal Corruption in Antebellum New York: Free Banking as Reform, in CORRUPTION AND REFORM: 
LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY 231 (Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia Goldin eds., 
2006); Eric Hilt, Corporation Law and the Shift Toward Open Access in the Antebellum United 
States (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w21195, 2015); Eric Hilt, History of 
American Corporate Governance: Law, Institutions, and Politics (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 20356, 2014); Eric Hilt & Jacqueline Valentine, Democratic Dividends: Stock-
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corporation can be viewed as a move away from elitism and oligopoly 
toward greater economic democracy and competition.94 
Predictably, alongside all of these good faith reasons for loosening 
corporate requirements were less noble ones. Corporate privilege in gen-
eral, and unconditional limited liability in particular, constituted a grand 
invitation to externalize costs upon others, and those actuated by such 
temptations found nobler-ringing rationalizations of their demands for 
corporate status ready at hand in the previously described develop-
ments.95 It is difficult to quantify precisely how prevalent responsibil-
ity-ducking motives were among even those clamoring for “free incorpo-
ration” on plausible political and economic grounds. However, the litera-
ture suggests that, by the late nineteenth century, the “market for incor-
poration” had become rife with “stock-watering,” creditor-swindling, and 
other scams.96 
Ironically, advocates of so-called free-banking and other minimally 
regulated forms of financial service (such as insurance and nonbank 
lending) appear to have played a lead role in gradually persuading legis-
latures to drop the conditions once generally imposed upon corporate 
status.97 These advocates, primarily entrepreneurs looking for additional 
sources of credit to finance rapid business expansion, sought and eventu-
ally procured general incorporation statutes for banks and other lending 
institutions—institutions expressly founded for purposes of profit-
making but easily characterized as public utilities under conditions of 
                                                                                                                                     
holding, Wealth and Politics in New York, 1791–1826 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 17147, 2011). 
 94. See sources cited supra note 93. We emphasize that our claim here is not that the original 
corporate settlement was perfectly effective in curbing private abuses and serving the public interest 
in every instance. Any such claim would be naïve, at best. Our goal is merely to bring into focus the 
fundamental conceptual and normative shift in the prevailing understanding of the corporation, 
which took place in the later part of the nineteenth century. 
 95. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 52. 
 96. See, e.g., ALLEN ET AL., supra note 78, at 161. 
 97. “Free banking” refers to a specific period in U.S. history (1836–1863) during which there 
was no federal bank regulation and no central bank, state bank charters were “freely” available with-
out special legislative grants, and individual banks were free to issue their own paper currencies. The 
free banking era was notoriously turbulent, with highly unstable and unreliable currency values and 
high rates of bank failure. RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
9 (2013). For more on free banking and its history see, for example, Howard Bodenhorn, Entry, 
Rivalry and Free Banking in Antebellum America, 72 REV. ECON. & STAT. 682 (1990); Andrew 
Economopoulous & Heather O’Neill, Bank Entry During the Antebellum Period, 27 J. MONEY, 
CREDIT & BANKING 1071 (1995); Kenneth Ng, Free Banking Laws and Barriers to Entry in Bank-
ing, 1838–1860, 48 J. ECON. HIST. 877 (1988). For the role played by free banking advocacy in 
pushing the proliferation of general corporate laws, see, for example, SEAVOY, supra note 18, at 53–
176. 
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capital scarcity.98 Their successes paved the way for procurement of gen-
eral incorporation statutes by other for-profit institutions including non-
financial businesses. As discussed below, success along these lines is 
ironic in light of the fact that modern banks have become classic vestigial 
cases of the older, more restrictive corporate-regulatory environment.99 
In any event, over time, the status and understanding of the corpo-
ration radically changed from what they originally had been. Corporate 
charters became easier to obtain, the ultra vires doctrine declined, dissi-
pated, and ultimately disappeared,100 and even capital regulation was re-
placed, first with liability insurance requirements and later by virtually 
no requirements at all.101 Today, all that remains of the ancien régime are 
the doctrines of equitable subordination,102 fraudulent conveyance,103 and 
corporate veil-piercing.104 These legal doctrines are designed to police 
against particularly vulgar forms of abuse of the corporate form that ef-
fectively defraud voluntary creditors, but little more.105 
While the evisceration of strict purpose-focused conditionality and 
the associated doctrine of ultra vires may be historically justified, and 
even practically inevitable in light of the factors described above, it 
                                                            
 98. See sources cited supra note 97. 
 99. See infra Part II. 
 100. See Horwitz, supra note 21, at 186–87 (“By 1930, the ultra vires doctrine was, if not dead, 
substantially eroded in practice, reflecting the triumphant view that corporate organization was a 
normal and natural form of business activity.”); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 13, at 1663–64. For 
a discussion of the limited continuing relevance of the ultra vires doctrine, see Kent Greenfield, 
Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (with Notes on How Corporate 
Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279 (2001). 
 101. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 77 and especially 78. 
 102. Equitable subordination is a doctrine in the law of debtor–creditor relations pursuant to 
which a creditor who is also an owner of, or controlling shareholder in, a firm will be subordinated, 
under appropriate circumstances, to other creditors in insolvency, on the theory that she is at least 
partly responsible for the firm’s insolvency and is attempting to “jump the queue” in recharacterizing 
her equity stake in the firm as a credit stake. See, e.g., ALLEN ET AL., supra note 78, at 155–61. 
 103. Fraudulent conveyance is a doctrine in bankruptcy law pursuant to which disbursements 
to certain creditors prior to insolvency can be reversed, under appropriate circumstances, on the 
theory that they amount to “queue-jumping” on the part of the favored creditors. Id. 
 104. “Veil-piercing” is the colloquial term for a court showing disregard for shareholders’ 
limited liability under conditions in which the privilege appears to have been abused to the detriment 
of third parties who have transacted, voluntarily or involuntarily, with the corporation. “Abuse” can 
take many forms, including gross undercapitalization, comingling of corporate and personal assets, 
failure to observe certain corporate formalities, and other factors. Veil-piercing is most often done in 
the context of closely-held corporations, where disregard of corporate formalities tends to be more 
easily exposed. The canonical empirical study of American veil-piercing cases, highlighting the 
factors that appear to have weighed most heavily in court decisions to pierce, is Robert B. Thomp-
son, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991). A recent 
update, as well as partial correction of Thompson’s original study, is Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing, 89 
TEX. L. REV. 81 (2010). 
 105. See, e.g., ALLEN ET AL., supra note 78, at 161. 
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should not automatically be viewed as an immutable “end-of-history” 
state of corporate law and policy.106 Fundamental changes in the eco-
nomic, political, and ideological conditions that originally justified the 
rise of the “free incorporation” regime may necessitate an open-minded 
reassessment of that regime’s continuing efficacy and legitimacy.107 
Moreover, even as a descriptive matter, the triumph of the current regime 
is not as universal, and its boundaries are not as absolutely drawn, as is 
often assumed. The special case of the bank charter—that last vestige of 
the old corporate order—provides an intriguing opportunity to test some 
of these assumptions. 
II. THE “BANKING FRANCHISE”: WHAT IT STILL IS 
A. U.S. Bank Regulation: A (Very) Brief Overview 
As noted above, the U.S. system of bank regulation in important re-
spects replicates what used to be a system of corporation law more gen-
erally. First of all, in contrast to general incorporation, access to bank 
charters remains subject to exacting and case-by-case public control. The 
government controls entry into the banking industry by granting limited 
numbers of bank charters, which are required of anyone wishing to con-
duct banking business.108 In this sense, the government confers limited 
oligopoly status upon commercial banks. 
Bank charters are granted on an entity-by-entity basis, with each 
prospective bank’s organizing group submitting its own application and 
undergoing an individualized regulatory review.109 Pursuant to the re-
viewing process, bank organizers are required to submit detailed personal 
                                                            
 106. In fact, there is significant evidence that the old regime took a long time to disappear, with 
various forms of “special chartering” and not-strictly-limited shareholder liability continuing to 
linger in the early decades of the twentieth century. See, e.g., Hamill, supra note 81 (offering an 
empirical study of the continuing practice of “special chartering” by the states as a feature of the 
early twentieth-century corporate landscape). Notably, American bank shareholders remained sub-
ject to a so-called double liability regime until the major regulatory overhaul of 1933. Under this 
regime, shareholders were responsible for an insolvent bank’s debts beyond their individual invest-
ments, in an amount up to the par value of their stock. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Double Liability of Bank Shareholders: History and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 35–
39 (1992). 
 107. We consider these issues in greater detail below. See infra Part III. 
 108. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 27 (2012). This is the statutory ground for federally-granted, or 
national, bank charters. Under the so-called dual-banking system maintained in the United States, 
individual states charter banking institutions as well, each through its own statutory and administra-
tive regime. For more on dual banking, see CARNELL ET AL., supra note 97, at 11–12. 
 109. See generally 12 C.F.R. § 5.20 (2014); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 
CHARTERS: COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING MANUAL (2009), available at http://www.occ.gov/ 
publications/publications-by-type/licensing-manuals/charters.pdf. 
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information that establishes not only their professional competence but 
also their integrity and trustworthiness.110 Bank organizers are required to 
submit detailed financial information, business plans, and performance 
projections in order to convince chartering authorities of their ability to 
provide banking services in a safe and sound manner.111 Chartering au-
thorities specifically require proof that proposed banks will have suffi-
cient initial capital.112 Characteristically, another important element of 
the chartering process is the determination of whether a newly proposed 
bank will help meet its community’s banking needs—a direct reference 
to the public interest that the bank is expected to serve.113 
It is also worth noting that the grant and continuing efficacy of a 
bank charter are explicitly conditioned on a bank’s ongoing compliance 
with multiple limitations on its investments and activities. The charter, in 
other words, remains conditional for as long as it remains in effect, and 
banks can lose their charters by violating their conditions and effectively 
acting ultra vires. Strikingly similar to general corporation law of the 
past, U.S. banks are legally permitted to conduct only certain forms of 
business activities traditionally associated with banking, all of which are 
affirmatively enumerated in relevant banking statutes.114 Nearly all non-
financial, and even many financial activities and investments, are beyond 
banks’ legally granted powers.115 Further, unlike other modern-day cor-
porations, banks are subject to strict regulatory requirements to maintain, 
at all times, certain minimal levels of equity capital on their balance 
sheets.116 The penalties for violating capital requirements are quite harsh: 
violations can quickly lead to a bank being fined or liquidated, its offic-
ers’ being fined or imprisoned, or any combination thereof.117 
                                                            
 110. 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(g) (2014). 
 111. Id. § 5.20(g)(3), h(1)–(2). 
 112. Id. § 5.20(g)(3)(ii). 
 113. Id. § 5.20(h)(5). 
 114. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012); see also Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970). 
While it is true that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) has at times been quite 
liberal in its interpretations of the scope of banking powers—see, for example, Saule T. Omarova, 
The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the “Business of Banking,” 63 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1041 (2009)—this does not alter the fact that the bank-regulatory regime statutorily presuppos-
es that banks are entities with limited enumerated powers. 
 115. For a discussion of the general prohibition on U.S. banking organizations’ commercial 
activities, see Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodi-
ties, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 273–92 (2013). 
 116. Bank capital regulation is a rich and complex subject whose full treatment is beyond the 
scope of this Article. For more on the U.S. bank capital adequacy regulation, see CARNELL ET AL., 
supra note 97, at 216–39. 
 117. See, for example, 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (2012), to which all banks wishing to receive deposit 
insurance—irrespective of national or state chartering—are subject. A system of federal capital-
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State and federal regulatory and supervisory agencies closely moni-
tor each individual bank’s compliance with the applicable rules and regu-
lations. Banks are required to submit detailed information on nearly eve-
ry aspect of their operations and financial condition to the regulators.118 
Supervisory agencies routinely conduct on-site bank examinations for the 
purpose of assessing each bank’s compliance with the legal and regulato-
ry requirements and conditions attached to their charters.119 Banks that 
violate those requirements and conditions run the risk of having their 
charters revoked.120 
All of this is quite familiar to anyone with even a basic understand-
ing of how banks, or financial institutions more generally, operate and 
are overseen in this country.121 What generally goes unnoticed, however, 
is how closely contemporary U.S. bank regulation resembles a vestigial 
form of what once was generic corporation regulation. This is not only 
intriguing but deeply ironic, given that political pressures in the nine-
teenth century from advocates of free banking appear to have played a 
critical role in initially pushing legislatures toward broadening the corpo-
rate franchise.122 
Why, then, does modern U.S. bank regulation retain the basic char-
acteristics of what once was just corporate law simpliciter? Why are 
banks so clearly “special” as corporate entities?123 
                                                                                                                                     
based requirements and restrictions is known as “prompt corrective action.” See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o 
(2012); see also CARNELL ET AL., supra note 97, at 240. 
 118. For a list of reporting forms applicable to banking institutions, see Reporting Forms – 
FFIEC 102: Market Risk Regulatory Report for Institutions Subject to the Market Risk Capital Rule, 
FED. FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, https://www.ffiec.gov/forms102.htm (last updated July 7, 
2015). 
 119. For example, the OCC, the primary chartering and supervising authority for federally-
chartered U.S. banks, currently employs over 2,000 bank examiners. For more on the OCC’s bank 
supervision, see Examinations, OFFICE COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, http://www.occ.treas.gov/ 
topics/examinations/index-examinations.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2015). 
 120. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 93 (2012) (containing provisions governing termination of the rights 
and privileges of a national bank that commits certain violations of the National Bank Act). 
 121. It is worth noting that many, but not all, features of U.S. bank regulation apply, in some 
form or to some extent, to various other types of regulated financial intermediaries, such as insur-
ance companies or securities firms. 
 122. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the failures of free banking 
and the rise of central banks, see generally CHARLES GOODHART, THE EVOLUTION OF CENTRAL 
BANKS (1988). 
 123. Again, the question we pose here differs from the more familiar formulations asking 
whether or not banks are “special” as a type of a financial intermediary performing certain unique 
functions (e.g., providing transactional accounts, operating payments systems, serving as key pro-
viders of credit and channels of transmission of monetary policy). See Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, 
supra note 2. Access to explicit public subsidy in the form of federal deposit insurance and the cen-
tral bank’s liquidity support are also frequently used to explain why banks are “special”—i.e., spe-
cially regulated—financial services providers. Our focus in this Article, however, is on what we see 
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B. The Source of “Specialness”: Banks as Public Franchisees 
We suspect that banks continue to be treated as all corporations 
once were because in their case, the essential public–private franchise 
nature of the entity remains more starkly—if nevertheless seldom articu-
lately—apparent than it does in the case of other firms. 
Discovery of the public–private franchise nature of banks was hard 
in coming during the course of the “free banking” era from mid- to late 
nineteenth-century America.124 It emerged as the main lesson of painful 
events: multiple currency over-issuances by privately owned banking 
institutions, followed by system-wide panics and crashes, and the ulti-
mate failure of privately-formed clearing houses as means of pooling and 
self-regulatory lowering the risks of such crashes.125 Indeed, it was not 
until the nation once again established a central bank, the Federal Re-
serve System, in 1913, then tested its mettle in 1929 and immediately 
after, that we finally came to fully understand the requisite regulatory 
consequences of taking the “public utility” view of banks as seriously in 
respect of banks’ responsibilities as we did, at the behest of the “free 
bankers,” in respect of their rights.126 Today, nearly a century later, re-
discovering and reaffirming this painfully derived historical understand-
ing of banks’ public–private franchise nature should once again be at the 
top of our policy agenda. 
In calling for such rediscovery, we use the term “franchise” gener-
ally to refer to an arrangement whereby extraordinary privileges are pub-
licly conferred upon private enterprises only insofar as those enterprises 
perform certain essential public functions.127 The ways in which banks 
meet this particular understanding of “franchise” are familiar. The nature 
of banks as de facto public utilities in allocating credit and providing a 
payments system is commonly noted and recognized as warranting spe-
cial regulation, if not, according to some, nationalization.128 However, 
                                                                                                                                     
as a conceptually deeper explanation for the unique nature of modern banks as corporations. This 
conceptual shift also has potentially significant implications for revisiting the “specialness” of banks 
as financial intermediaries. We pursue this line of reasoning in a separate project. 
 124. See supra note 97. 
 125. See generally sources cited supra note 97. 
 126. For an in-depth scholarly analysis of the history, functions, and internal governance of the 
Federal Reserve System, see generally PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF 
THE FEDERAL RESERVE (forthcoming 2016). 
 127. See supra note 17. 
 128. See, e.g., Gar Alperovitz, Op-Ed., Wall Street Is Too Big to Regulate, N.Y. TIMES, July 
23, 2012, at A21, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/23/opinion/banks-that-are-too-big-to-regulate-
should-be-nationalized.html?_r=0; Rick Newman, Why Bank Nationalization Is So Scary, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Feb. 22, 2009, 2:27 PM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/ 
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banks should also be understood as franchises in a much more particular, 
indeed nearly literal, sense. This is perhaps best explained by reference 
to what any private banking institution linked to and backed up by a na-
tion’s central bank actually dispenses—namely, the full faith and credit 
of whatever nation has chartered the bank.129 In other words, it is not 
merely credit that banks in modern economies dispense—it is ultimately 
public credit. This distinction is crucial for understanding the nature of 
modern banking and bank regulation. 
Explaining the mechanics of a typical bank lending transaction will 
help in elucidating this distinction. In the United States, when a bank 
receives an application from a creditworthy entrepreneur to borrow, the 
bank opens or credits an account in the name of the borrower, then books 
the transaction as both (1) an asset and a matching liability of its own, 
and (2) an asset and a matching liability of the borrower.130 The transac-
tion books as an asset of the bank because the bank is now owed on the 
loan. It books as a liability of the bank because the bank must now honor 
all drafts drawn on account by the borrower up to the loan amount. At 
the same time, the transaction books as an asset of the borrower because 
the borrower now owns, and is able to draw payments upon, a new (or 
newly credited) account. It books as a liability of the borrower because 
the borrower must repay the bank in accordance with the terms of the 
loan agreement.131 
As a matter of accounting, this transaction does not violate any par-
ticular Newtonian law-like principle of, say, the “conservation of assets 
relative to liabilities.” There continues to be a direct one-to-one corre-
                                                                                                                                     
flowchart/2009/02/22/why-bank-nationalization-is-so-scary (“Former Federal Reserve Chairman 
Alan Greenspan has advocated nationalizing select banks. Famed prognosticator Nouriel Roubini 
says it’s the only way to go, since the whole sector is effectively insolvent. Sen. Chris Dodd, chair-
man of the Senate Banking Committee, roiled the markets recently by saying nationalization may be 
necessary for awhile.”); see also Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, supra note 2. 
 129. The discussion in the next several paragraphs draws partly upon Hockett & Omarova, 
supra note 35. 
 130. For an accessible, while not excessively over-simplified, account of the mechanics of 
bank lending, see Michael McLeay et al., Money in the Modern Economy, 54 BANK OF ENGLAND Q. 
BULL. 4 (2014), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/ 
quarterlybulletin/2014/qb14q101.pdf; see also Bank of England UK, Money Creation in the Modern 
Economy, YOUTUBE (March 12, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CvRAqR2pAgw (a 
helpful video series the Bank of England has produced to complement the McLeay article). An ab-
breviated and likewise accessible description of how bank lending works (although somewhat over-
stating the reserve and capital requirements to which the bank likely is subject in the United States) 
is John Carney, Basics of Banking: Loans Create a Lot More than Deposits, CNBC (Feb. 26, 2013, 
5:57 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100497710. See also John Carney, What Really Constrains Bank 
Lending, CNBC (Apr. 5, 2012, 5:08 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/46970418. 
 131. See sources cited supra note 130. 
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spondence between assets and liabilities, which by accounting conven-
tion are always mutually canceling.132 Nevertheless, as a result of this 
simple lending transaction, there is now more money at work in the 
economy, as routinely tracked by that measure of money known as 
“bank-,” “credit-,” or “broad-money.”133 Now, when the borrower draws 
on the bank account to pay third parties for their goods and services, 
those funds end up being deposited by the recipients in their own bank 
accounts, resulting in new rounds of corresponding asset-liability in-
creases in the banking system.134 In this sense, the original loan transac-
tion does effectively violate (at least, until the loan is discharged and ex-
tinguished) whatever the monetary counterpart to the Newtonian princi-
ple of “conservation of energy” might be called. By making that original 
loan, the bank has indeed (temporarily) created a form of “bank-money” 
seemingly out of thin air.135 
As if to underscore the last point, the central bank or monetary au-
thority will have to accommodate this act of money-creation undertaken 
by the privately owned lending bank.136 This is an inevitable result of the 
fact that, in most modern economies, the central bank or monetary au-
thority maintains an overnight, interbank lending rate target and/or ad-
ministers a payments infrastructure on which privately drawn checks 
clear at par.137 If the central bank refuses accommodation, then (a) the 
lending bank will have to borrow from other banks to meet its reserve 
requirements,138 placing upward pressure on the interbank rate, (b) some 
checks drawn on the lending bank will fail to clear at the central bank, or 
(c) both.139 
                                                            
 132. See sources cited supra note 130. 
 133. See sources cited supra note 130; see also ANN-MARIE MEULENDYKE, U.S. MONETARY 
POLICY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 8–16 (1998). 
 134. For an accessible and short explanation of how bank loans create deposits, see PETER L. 
BERNSTEIN, A PRIMER ON MONEY, BANKING, AND GOLD 49–65 (John Wiley & Sons, 2008) (1965). 
 135. Id. 
 136. See infra note 139 and text accompanying notes 139–140. 
 137. For a general overview of how the Federal Reserve System maintains interbank lending 
rates and administers the U.S. payments system, see, for example, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS (9th ed. 
2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf. 
 138. In the United States, depository institutions are required to maintain a specified fraction of 
their liabilities in reserve, either in cash or as reserve account balances at the relevant Federal Re-
serve Bank. See id. at 41–42. 
 139. For more on these mechanics and what drives them, see, for example, Jaromir Benes & 
Michael Kumhof, The Chicago Plan Revisited (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 12/202, 
2012); Ulrich Bindseil, The Operational Target of Monetary Policy and the Rise and Fall of Reserve 
Position Doctrine (European Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 372, 2004); and Piti Disyatat, Mone-
tary Policy Implementation: Misconceptions and Their Consequences (Bank for Int’l Settlements, 
Working Paper No. 269, 2008). 
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The central bank will then accommodate the private bank’s loan by 
crediting that bank’s reserve account, thereby enabling checks drawn on 
the new account by the original borrower from the bank to clear.140 In 
effect, the central bank will be publicly monetizing the promissory note 
signed by the individual borrower in favor of the lending bank, placing 
the full faith and credit of the nation behind the credit of the individual. 
The entire process is part of the well-known structural arrangement be-
tween the central bank, privately owned banks, and the banks’ borrow-
ers.141 
This briefly outlined and simplified set of mechanics of an ordinary 
bank loan transaction reveals something very important yet underappre-
ciated about our banking system. It shows that privately owned banks 
effectively dispense an indefinitely extensible public resource, a resource 
on which they are licensed, moreover, to charge private oligopoly rents. 
In essence, the banks are privileged, privately run outlets for something 
that is ultimately publicly produced and more or less freely extended to 
them—something that the banks, in turn, dispense for a profit. In the 
United States, that precious something is the monetized full faith and 
credit of the United States. By allowing banks to earn rents on this re-
source, we are effectively privatizing seigniorage.142 
It is unsurprising, of course, that the average member of the pub-
lic—of that very “we” that collectively produces the ultimate resource in 
question—is blissfully unaware of the dynamics described above. It is 
quite possible that even the typical member of Congress may not fully 
understand this process or be able to articulate its implications. Neverthe-
less, most policymakers must be at least intuitively aware of the special 
nature of the banks as dispensers of a public resource—hence of their 
role as franchisees. It is likely for this reason that so many vestiges of the 
old corporation law regime remain in place where banks are concerned. 
The original “corporate franchise” is alive and well in their case. 
C. Potential Fragility of “Specialness” 
In recent decades, however, there have been trends that sometimes 
appear to portend a fate for banking law not unlike that of corporation 
                                                            
 140. See sources cited supra note 139. 
 141. See sources cited supra note 139. 
 142. Seigniorage is the premium enjoyed by an issuer of money in virtue of his, her, or its 
capacity to spend the very money that he, she, or it is issuing. For example, if a dollar—which is a 
Federal Reserve Note—costs .01 dollars to print, the Fed enjoys .99 dollars worth of seigniorage on 
every paper dollar it spends. In turn, where the Fed issues dollars simply through keystrokes the 
seigniorage it enjoys is greater yet. 
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law. Two related phenomena stand out in this respect. The first is the 
steady loosening of various conditions traditionally attached to bank 
charters and the gradual delegation of certain regulatory tasks to banks’ 
internal management.143 Since the 1980s, the U.S. banking industry has 
successfully pushed for a series of legislative and regulatory expansions 
of bank-permissible structural affiliations, investments, and other activi-
ties.144 Perhaps the most dramatic and far-reaching example of such regu-
latory expansion is found in the area of banks’ derivatives trading.145 An-
other well-known example in this respect is the weakening, and even 
downright disappearance, of the legal limits on bank affiliations with 
nonbank firms within holding company structures.146 
The second phenomenon that threatens banks’ “special” treatment 
is a tendency among some legal scholars to treat banking practices that 
culminated in the latest global financial crisis as largely reducible to gar-
den-variety corporate governance matters, as if banks were not “special” 
after all.147 Undoubtedly, improving internal governance and correcting 
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various misalignments in banks’ internal incentive structures are im-
portant and necessary steps toward potentially reducing the overall risks 
that activities of individual banks pose to the financial system. However, 
even if individual banks are able to get these things right—and that is a 
big “if”—changes in their internal governance would not eliminate the 
need for an additional layer of externally-imposed safeguards aimed at 
protecting the interests of the broader public as the key bank stakehold-
er.148 To the extent that the dominant doctrines of corporate law and gov-
ernance tend to focus on firms’ shareholders, managers, and creditors—
typically, easily identifiable private parties with relatively well-defined 
interests in the firm—these doctrines are generally ill-equipped to ad-
dress the full complexities of governing inherently hybrid public–private 
entities such as banks.149 In many important respects, banks may be ex-
actly like all modern corporations, but in many other respects, they are 
not. 
Ironically, both of these phenomena might contain unintended 
seeds of deeper wisdom. It might be true that banks are, in fact, not “spe-
cial” after all; this does not necessarily, however, lead to the conclusion 
that banks should be treated the same way that general corporations are 
currently treated by law and legal scholarship. To the contrary, the real 
lesson might be that all corporations should be treated as they once were, 
and as banks continue to be. In other words, it might be time for the law 
to rediscover the franchise-like nature of any corporation enjoying pub-
licly-granted privileges, such as separate personality, perpetual existence, 
asset segregation (including limited shareholder liability), or formally 
recognized oligopoly status—and accordingly reimpose conditions upon 
these extraordinary privileges. Scholars, for their part, may have to rec-
ognize that faith in the power of corporate governance to avert corpo-
                                                                                                                                     
2571739&alg=1&pos=3. 
 148. Not surprisingly, in the wake of the recent global financial crisis, there has been a growing 
recognition and acknowledgment of the fact that the government—and the public it represents—is 
the ultimate residual stakeholder in privately owned and publicly-backed banks. See Anna Gelpern, 
Common Capital: A Thought Experiment in Cross-Border Resolution, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J. 355 
(2014); Hockett & Omarova, supra note 25. 
 149. Some of the limitations of traditional corporate law and corporate governance doctrines 
became clear in the aftermath of the government bailout of certain large firms during the financial 
crisis of 2008–2009. For insightful analyses of the doctrinal difficulties that corporate law faces in 
dealing with a sovereign shareholder, see, for example, Steven M. Davidoff, Uncomfortable Em-
brace: Federal Corporate Ownership in the Midst of the Financial Crisis, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1733 
(2011); Steven Davidoff Solomon & David Zaring, After the Deal: Fannie, Freddie, and the Finan-
cial Crisis Aftermath, 95 B.U. L. REV. 371 (2015); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the 
Government Is the Controlling Shareholder, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1293 (2011); J.W. Verrett, Treasury 
Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283 (2010). 
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rate-wrought social ills involves a significant element of wishful think-
ing, not only for purposes of bank regulation but for purposes of corpora-
tion law as well. 
This, of course, would be a radical shift in current understandings 
of the nature of the modern corporation. However, thinking through the 
potential policy implications of such a shift presents an opportunity for 
potentially illuminating intellectual experimentation. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FRANCHISE VIEW: RETHINKING THE     
PUBLIC–PRIVATE BALANCE 
A. Framing the Inquiry: If We No Longer Permit “Free Banking,” Why 
Permit “Free Incorporating”? 
Reminding ourselves of the original public franchise character of 
the corporation, and of the continuing public franchise character of bank-
ing institutions, invites a number of broader reflections on the social 
functions and significance of existing forms of enterprise organization. 
Such reflections, in turn, invite tentative new policy considerations. As 
suggested above, those that are most intriguing play on the continuing 
vitality of the regulatory commonplace that “banks are special.”150 Inas-
much as the histories of the corporate form and of banking regulation 
suggest that the latter in its current guise is much like the former in its 
original guise—and for much the same reasons—banks’ “specialness” 
becomes more a matter of degree than a categorical distinction. From this 
perspective, it is tempting to engage in a thought experiment and ask 
whether the stark distinction between the two regulatory regimes in their 
present forms ought not itself to be blurred at the margins. 
We see two principal ways to frame this inquiry. First, if the dis-
pensing of corporate privileges is not regulated or conditioned as it once 
was, should banking corporations continue to be regulated as they are? 
Or second, to flip that question, if banks continue to be regulated as all 
corporations once were, notwithstanding free banking advocates’ lead 
role in changing the corporation law regime late in the nineteenth centu-
ry, might it be worth reexamining the latter regime with a view to retriev-
ing some of the lost forms of regulation?151 
The first question—whether it makes sense to bring bank regulation 
into closer conformity with the broader corporation law regime—was 
repeatedly raised by the advocates of banking and broader financial de-
                                                            
 150. See supra note 2 for a reminder of the significance of this regulatory phrase of art. 
 151. On the historical role played by the free banking movement in pushing the unconditional 
corporate privilege agenda, see supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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regulation that started in the 1980s and did not come to a halt until the 
financial crisis broke out in autumn 2008.152 For obvious reasons, few are 
openly posing that question now in the postcrisis period. As painful 
memories of the 2008–2009 financial crisis fade away, this tiresome de-
bate might well resurface, perhaps cleverly repackaged in updated termi-
nology. Hopefully, that day is still some ways off. 
For present purposes, it is the second question—whether it might 
make sense to re-introduce some form of publicly imposed conditions 
on, and control over, all private business entities availing themselves of 
publicly granted corporate privileges—that presents more intriguing pol-
icy and intellectual possibilities and deserves closer consideration. 
The full force of the question becomes especially clear in light of 
the fact that most justifications of the continuing existence of corporate 
privilege today sound ultimately in the imperative of capitalization. This 
causal link between corporate privilege and capital mobilization is a fun-
damental assumption underlying the dominant narrative of corporate law 
and policy. Relentless and unquestioning assertion of this assumed link 
in every orthodox account made its argumentative, interpretive logic in-
visible behind the veil of supposedly descriptive “objectivity.” Because 
modern productive activity is so much more capital-intensive than it was 
in the early nineteenth century, the argument runs, firms require even 
heavier participation on the part of scattered investors than they once 
did.153 Only in this way can scarce capital be mobilized to finance pro-
ductive activity in a more or less laissez-faire economy.154 In order for 
this to happen, the argument continues, those who help finance firms 
must not be made to worry that they will lose their personal assets in the 
event that firms go bankrupt and leave creditors holding empty bags, nor 
may we allow some contributors to firms to worry that creditors of other 
contributors might be able to tap firm resources in the event of default by 
the latter.155 Furthermore, this line of thought continues, optimal capitali-
zation of firms in primary capital markets requires “deep,” liquid sec-
ondary markets lest investors feel trapped by or locked in to their in-
vestments.156 But the development of such markets, in turn, requires that 
                                                            
 152. See, e.g., MATTHEW SHERMAN, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POLICY RESEARCH, A SHORT 
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL DEREGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2009), available at 
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/dereg-timeline-2009-07.pdf. 
 153. For a condensed general statement of the typical argument, phrased in the traditional 
shareholder-centric language, see, for example, Carney, supra note 53, at 669–71. 
 154. See id.   
 155. See id.; see also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 10.  
 156. Carney, supra note 53, at 669–71; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 10; see also 
ALLEN ET AL., supra note 78, at 145; KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 10, at 1–5.  
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the value of firm shares not vary too closely with the personal wealth or 
credit exposures of its investor-owners, as it would were firm and inves-
tor assets not legally segregated.157 
This line of argument is entirely intelligible under conditions of 
capital scarcity that prevailed in the nineteenth century. It is remarkably 
out of synch, however, with contemporary monetary and financial condi-
tions. One key lesson of the last three decades of financial sector volatili-
ty is that credit aggregates and other forms of finance capital are any-
thing but scarce.158 Moreover, given the role played by any central bank 
or equivalent monetary authority that administers a sovereign and elastic 
currency, finance capital cannot be truly “scarce.”159 To the contrary, one 
of the greatest financial policy challenges we have faced in recent dec-
ades is the problem of overabundance and undermodulation—along with 
the usual dangers of misallocation—of capital in the global financial sys-
tem.160 Today’s large, globally-active institutional investors seem to be 
constantly “searching for yield,” thereby underwriting destabilizing de-
mand for complex financial instruments structured to generate high re-
turns, while hiding the true extent of underlying risk.161 This suggests 
that constitutive characteristics of the corporation law regime aimed at 
attracting share-purchasers—however well-advised they might have 
looked in the nineteenth century when capital was indeed scarce and 
                                                            
 157. See sources cited supra note 156.  
 158. See, e.g., Daniel Alpert, Robert Hockett & Nouriel Roubini, The Way Forward (New Am. 
Found., Policy Paper, Oct. 11, 2011), available at http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/ 
the_way_forward; Ben S. Bernanke, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Sandridge Lecture, 
Virginia Association of Economists: The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit 
(Mar. 10, 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/200503102/; 
see also Hockett & Omarova, supra note 35. 
 159. See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 35. The truth and significance of this observation has 
in recent years been reemphasized by proponents of “Modern Money Theory,” or “MMT.” See, e.g., 
L. RANDALL WRAY, MODERN MONEY THEORY: A PRIMER ON MACROECONOMICS FOR SOVEREIGN 
MONETARY SYSTEMS (1st ed. 2012).   
 160. See sources cited supra note 158. See also Hockett & Omarova, supra note 25.  
 161. See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 25. This capital glut and investors’ “search for yield” 
fueled the junk-bond craze of the 1980s, interest in loan participations during the 1990s, and the 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) bubble of the early- to mid-2000s. During that last episode, high-
risk MBSs and related products were structured specifically to get the highest credit ratings indicat-
ing their supposedly “riskless” status, while paying interest at rates higher than U.S. government 
bonds. For in-depth analyses of the effects of the growing investor demand for U.S. government 
debt, see Arvind Krishnamurthy & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, The Aggregate Demand for Treasury 
Debt, 120 J. POL. ECON. 233 (2012); Zoltan Pozsar, Institutional Cash Pools and the Triffin Dilem-
ma of U.S. Banking System (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 11/190, 2011), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11190.pdf; Ben S. Bernanke et al., International 
Capital Flows and the Returns to Safe Assets in the United States, 2003–2007 (Federal Reserve 
System, Int’l Fin. Discussion Papers No. 1014, 2011), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2011/1014/ifdp1014.pdf. 
486 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 39:453 
there was no central bank or monetary authority authorized to issue a 
currency untethered to specie—are superfluous, if not dangerous, under 
present conditions.162 
This observation finds empirical support not only in recent experi-
ences with credit-fueled asset price bubbles, including that in the lead-up 
to the 2008–2009 financial crisis,163 but also, less directly, in the increas-
ingly heated debate over certain dysfunctional dynamics in the practice 
of contemporary corporate finance. For example, it is not uncommon at 
present to hear complaints that firms increasingly finance operational 
expansion, insofar as they operationally expand at all, primarily through 
redeployment of retained earnings rather than new capital infusions, and 
that such new capital infusions are deployed simply to bring short-term 
gains to favored shareholders.164 It is also common to hear complaints 
that companies are hoarding their earnings, instead of reinvesting them 
and thus boosting sluggish postcrisis consumer demand.165 Finally, some 
critics attack corporate managers for using retained earnings to repur-
chase shares from current holders with the intent to artificially—and 
ephemerally—drive up share prices so as to boost managerial compensa-
tion calculated by reference to share price.166 This criticism suggests that 
some incorporated firms—even nonfinancial firms—are effectively in-
flating mini-bubbles in their own equity securities simply in order to en-
rich management, thereby undermining the long-term viability of firms 
and the productive, employment-boosting activities they are meant to 
engage in.167 
It is not the aim of this Article to adjudicate these claims or the 
scholarly and policy debates they have occasioned. The key point here is 
that all of these commonly heard complaints derive from conditions of 
                                                            
 162. These characteristics of the corporation law regime may now be dangerous to the extent 
that they create incentives that tend to enable or exacerbate the inflation of periodic financial asset 
price bubbles. See sources cited supra note 158. 
 163. See sources cited supra notes 158 and 161; see also Robert Hockett, Debt, Deflation, and 
Debacle (May 21, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2268230. 
 164. See, e.g., William Lazonick, The Financialization of the U.S. Corporation: What Has 
Been Lost, and How It Can be Regained, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 857 (2013); J. W. Mason, Disgorge 
the Cash: The Disconnect Between Corporate Borrowing and Investment, ROOSEVELT INST. (Feb. 2, 
2015), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/sites/all/files/Mason_Disgorge_the_Cash.pdf. A provocative 
book-length treatment of these matters is LORRAINE TALBOT, PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2013). 
 165. See, e.g., Lazonick, supra note 164. 
 166. See sources cited supra note 164; see also William Lazonick, Profits without Prosperity: 
Stock Buy-Backs Manipulate the Market and Leave Most Americans Worse Off, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Sept. 2014, at 3–11. 
 167. See sources cited supra notes 164–166. 
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capital overabundance, and that the salience of these arguments is fun-
damentally incompatible with the concept of capital scarcity or any asso-
ciated need to lure investments from skittish would-be shareholders. 
These debates point to problems that emerge only when the quantum of 
finance capital looking for yield significantly exceeds the capacity of 
corporate managers to find productive deployments for it. In this context, 
all of the familiar arguments for continued unconditional corporate privi-
lege sounding in a putative need to attract shareholders, however apt they 
might once have been, sound strikingly anachronistic. 
If the principal public-policy reasons for unconditional grants of 
corporate privilege—viz. the need to attract scarce, risk-averse private 
capital to finance industrial development—are no longer as operative as 
they might have been in the nineteenth century, why does the law remain 
so unquestioningly wedded to the historical product of that era? What 
might be done to reintroduce some form of conditionality to the incorpo-
ration of business entities?168 
B. Revisiting the Corporate Franchise: Some Tentative Possibilities 
Like any query raising the possibility of upsetting a 
well-established regime backed by powerful entrenched interests, think-
ing through what it would be to reintroduce conditions on incorporation 
is a complex deliberative exercise. At present, it may not be possible to 
offer definitive answers to the many questions, both technical and politi-
cal, such an exercise may raise. Nevertheless, it is still possible to start 
sketching out at least some of the principal options, using U.S. bank reg-
ulation as a valuable source of guidance and a vestigial franchise model 
of incorporation. 
The first issue to be addressed is the question of which conditions 
the public, as franchisor, might wish to impose upon incorporated private 
business entities. This is, of course, the most important question: what is 
it the public wants private corporations to do, or refrain from doing, in 
return for the extraordinary privileges of legally recognized corporate 
personality, perpetual existence, asset segregation, limited shareholder 
                                                            
 168. One could also ask whether it makes sense to consider abolishing limited liability and 
certain other corporate privileges altogether. Proposals to replace limited liability with some form of 
proportionate liability were at the center of a lively debate among corporate law scholars back in the 
1980s–1990s. For a representative sample of academic writings on this issue, see supra note 52. We 
do not intend to replay the arguments advanced in this debate, partly because it seems unlikely to be 
particularly fruitful at this point and partly because we find the issue of reintroducing conditionality 
far more intellectually intriguing. 
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liability, and the like?169 Although the specific requirements imposed 
upon firms as conditions of incorporation would directly and inevitably 
shape the scope and operation of a newly restored ultra vires doctrine, 
the substance of any such conditions is not simply a legal matter—it is a 
fundamentally political one.170 Any new requirements will have to reflect 
deliberate normative judgments as to what types of micro-economic 
choices and strategies are of sufficient potential significance, from a 
macro-economic and overall public policy perspective, to warrant explic-
it intervention. 
Ideally, the normative judgments in question should be derived 
through a process of democratic deliberation, which helps both to legiti-
mize substantive policy choices and to smooth implementation. In prac-
tice, of course, reaching any such consensus in the political (or adminis-
trative) arena is invariably fraught with conflict, as numerous competing 
interest groups push forward their own agendas and their own definitions 
of the relevant “public interest.”171 In the absence of a clearly articulated 
collective vision of corporate public responsibilities—or even a public 
commitment to articulate such a vision—it would be simply too difficult 
to formulate any complete set of specific, detailed conditions on corpo-
rate privilege. 
But one has to start somewhere. For practical reasons, it may be 
best to start small, building from there in a bottom-up fashion. For in-
stance, one might begin by taking a clue from the bank chartering pro-
cess and require each business entity that seeks incorporation to provide 
the following to chartering authorities: (1) a more specific description of 
the business activities it plans to conduct (a statement of “business pur-
pose”); and (2) a separate description of how exactly its business activi-
                                                            
 169. For a reminder of the extraordinary nature of these now commonly taken for granted 
corporate attributes, see supra Part I.A. 
 170. It is worth noting here that Adolf Berle famously argued that corporate managers are best 
understood as having a duty to act in the public interest; as such, objectively cognizable public inter-
est is articulated in the political arena. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 52, at 312–13. For an 
in-depth analysis of Berle’s approach to the role of corporate managers as agents of the public, see 
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of The Modern 
Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849 (2010). 
 171. The concept of public interest is, of course, inherently complex and its meaning is often 
highly contestable. Given the heightened economic stakes involved, the struggle to define the cog-
nizable public interest is bound to be especially bitter in the context of business or financial regula-
tion. See, e.g., Mike Feintuck, Regulatory Rationales Beyond the Economic: In Search of the Public 
Interest, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 39, 45–46 (Robert Baldwin et al. eds., 2010). 
Nevertheless, the complexity of this exercise does not lessen the need for, and importance of, under-
taking it. 
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ties would benefit the national, regional, or local economy or community 
(a statement of “public purpose”).172 
At this point, it is easy to imagine the familiar reaction of dis-
missive eye-rolling: “Oh well, everyone knows that asking modern cor-
porations to define their business purposes would be inefficient and im-
practical!”173 But this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, our suggestion 
would require firms’ incorporators, and then managers, to make public 
commitments to a particular conception of what their companies hope to 
accomplish, and why the presence of their firms would be good both for 
those who purchase stakes in them and for the rest of us. Yet, this is ac-
tually a good thing. In practice, such boundary-defining exercises are 
indispensable to the survival and success of any firm as a business con-
cern. Business organizers must be able to “sell” the idea of a new firm as 
a prospective maker of goods or provider of services to the firm’s target 
investors before the latter are ready to part with their money.174 Having a 
clear understanding of what a prospective company will do, and where it 
will stand in relation to other entities in the market, is also a prerequisite 
for successfully managing its affairs as a going concern. As a substantive 
matter, therefore, publicly declaring this vision in a new firm’s corporate 
documents should not create any problematic new constraints on the 
firm’s ability to thrive and generate profits.175 
The requisite statements of business purpose and public purpose 
need not be equally elaborate in all cases, so as to avoid unfairly inhibit-
ing the incorporation of small, local firms that might find it more diffi-
cult to show any likely large-scale national economic impact. In fact, the 
criteria for satisfying both the “business purpose” and “public purpose” 
                                                            
 172. In effect, the requirement to state the corporation’s “public purpose” would replicate that 
pursuant to which seekers of new banking charters inform chartering authorities of how their pro-
posed banks will serve the convenience and needs of the community. See supra note 113 and ac-
companying text. 
 173. For a basic rendition of this assumption see, for example, KLEIN, COFFEE & PARTNOY, 
supra note 13, at 155. 
 174. In fact, under U.S. securities laws and regulations, publicly traded corporations are explic-
itly required to describe their business activities in mandatory public filings. 
 175. It is reasonable to expect that it would be easier for smaller firms to state their business 
purpose, while diversified corporate conglomerates might find it more challenging to define their 
core business pursuits in a sufficiently concrete but not overly restrictive manner. As a technical 
matter, however, arriving at such definition is made significantly easier by the existence of the North 
American Industry Classifications System (NAICS). NAICS is “the standard used by Federal statis-
tical agencies in classifying business establishments for the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and 
publishing statistical data related to the U.S. business economy.” North American Industry Classifi-
cation System, U. S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics (last revised Aug. 4, 
2015). Choosing the relevant NAICS categories can serve as a helpful basis for preparing the corpo-
ration’s “business purpose” statement. 
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requirements should be sufficiently capacious and adjustable to reflect 
not only the size and potential economic footprint of an individual corpo-
ration but also the relevant industry dynamics and other potentially sig-
nificant factors. 
The “public purpose” requirement raises particularly complex is-
sues in this respect. We do not advocate top-down government imposi-
tion of some sort of strict mandate with respect to what business a private 
corporation must pursue. Given modern market complexities, “public 
purpose” must be understood as a nonformalistic, capacious, and flexible 
concept. This is critical for conceptualizing the corporation as a public–
private hybrid rather than a purely public instrumentality. At the same 
time, however, it is important to ensure that clever corporate lawyers do 
not subvert the new incorporation regime by simply devising a lexicon of 
blandly noncommittal terms for describing the public benefit individual 
corporations plan to deliver. For example, vague claims that the corpora-
tion’s contribution to the national economy and the public’s well-being 
consists of “increased competition” or “job creation,” without further 
detail or substantiation, should not be acceptable as bona fide statements 
of public purpose. In other words, while these requirements certainly 
should not create overly strict hurdles, there has to be a showing of some 
more or less specific positive externality in exchange for the receipt of 
corporate privileges. 
One example of such positive externality, whose presence or ab-
sence could be given particularly great weight in reviewing corporate 
charter applications, is the impact of incorporating a specific business 
entity on sustainable domestic employment levels. It is hardly an exag-
geration to view the massive outsourcing of manufacturing and other 
jobs abroad in recent decades as one of the most pressing economic poli-
cy problems the United States is facing today. As long as U.S. corpora-
tions are viewed as purely private actors, single-mindedly pursuing pri-
vate profits wherever they may be had, it will be nearly impossible to 
halt this trend in time to avoid potentially irreversible long-term damage 
to the nation’s manufacturing capacity, broader economy, and sociopolit-
ical cohesion. Conditioning charters on private firms’ commitment to 
maintain some minimum level of domestic production and employment 
offers a direct regulatory mechanism for counteracting firms’ incentives 
to maximize short-term private gains at the expense of long-term public 
interest.176 
                                                            
 176. There are presumably various ways of operationalizing this mechanism. For example, the 
official chartering criteria might include a requirement that every U.S. corporation at all times main-
tain something like a “predominantly domestic employer” status, which would be tied to a specified 
 
2016] “Special,” Vestigial, or Visionary? 491 
Furthermore, it might be desirable to treat a corporation’s mandato-
ry statements of business and public purposes as incorporated by refer-
ence in its charter. This would have several important consequences from 
the viewpoint of corporate governance. For example, a significant 
change in the corporation’s business model would then require filing an 
amendment with the chartering authority as well as, perhaps, obtaining 
shareholder approval.177 Some might view this as a good way to curb the 
excessive power of corporate managers, while others might criticize any 
such arrangement as an undue interference with managerial freedom. 
From our perspective, what really matters here is the introduction of a 
procedural point of potential review of proposed corporate actions by the 
chartering authority as the acting public franchisor. To strengthen this 
effect, it might be desirable to add two specific features to this “amend-
ment of corporate purpose” regime. First, the law could require that all 
corporate filings of amended business or public purpose be accompanied 
by documentation explaining the nature of the proposed change, the pri-
mary reasons for it, and the steps the corporation took or plans to take to 
alleviate any potentially significant negative impact of the contemplated 
change on the economy or community.178 Second, the law could mandate 
                                                                                                                                     
threshold of the firm’s operations being conducted in the United States (or, in some cases, by U.S. 
citizens paying U.S. taxes). To accommodate certain potentially legitimate contingencies, the new 
regime might provide exceptions to this requirement. For instance, certain firms may be allowed to 
shut down or outsource to other countries a greater proportion of its U.S. operations and yet keep 
their corporate status and privileges intact if they take sufficiently effective steps to alleviate the 
negative impact of their actions. Such steps might include, for example, a commitment to find com-
parable new employment or job retraining for its former workers or a pledge of a certain percentage 
of the corporation’s pretax revenues to a public fund set up for such purposes. These are, of course, 
merely tentative suggestions on how such a regime may be designed. The devil is, as always, in the 
details. For our purposes, the key is to show that once we overcome certain unquestioned assump-
tions concerning the legitimate boundaries of public intervention in corporate affairs, we may be 
able to see a variety of potential solutions to what currently appear as intractable socioeconomic 
problems. 
 177. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13 (2012) (Act provision dealing with “changes in investment policy”). It 
is worth noting that similar requirements currently apply to federally-regulated investment compa-
nies. See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2012). 
 178. This requirement is likely to have significant implications for corporate governance, espe-
cially in terms of encouraging meaningful participation of corporations’ employees and other exter-
nal stakeholders in corporate decision-making. Thus, in order to convince the regulators that a par-
ticular change in the firm’s basic business strategy would not cause serious public harm, the firm’s 
managers would be well-advised to consult with the constituencies likely to be directly affected by 
such change. In this sense, the introduction of even a modest form of conditionality in the chartering 
process, suggested in this Article, would potentially create an important opening for the emergence 
of meaningful workplace democracy and a more generally inclusive form of corporate governance. 
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that no such amendment becomes effective until the chartering authority 
approves it.179 
Under this regime, a corporation acting in contravention of its own 
stated purposes would be deemed to have violated the explicit provisions 
of its corporate charter and hence the conditions of its incorporation. 
Then, much as in the banking world, the range of potential penalties for 
such violations could include mandatory termination of the corporate 
charter.180 Furthermore, and again like banks, corporations could also 
face a direct threat of having their charters revoked if they commit cer-
tain violations of legal or administrative rules and thus fail to maintain 
their regulatory “good standing” status.181 Explicitly conditioning the 
continuation of corporate status and attendant corporate privileges on the 
firm’s legal and regulatory compliance record, in effect, would reframe 
the notion of corporate purpose in negative terms: it would state what the 
public franchisor affirmatively does not want corporations to do, in view 
of potential public harms posed by such actions.182 At the same time, this 
approach has the advantage of being essentially incremental. All corpora-
tions must comply with laws and regulations applicable to their activities 
and are subject to various, potentially significant, civil, criminal, and 
administrative penalties for failing to do so.183 And, even under the cur-
                                                            
 179. To ease the inevitable logistical pressures, it might make sense to specify situations in 
which a particular application for amending a statement of corporate purpose would be deemed 
approved, if the chartering authority did not take any action on such application within a specified 
period. 
 180. For a discussion of bank chartering and regulation, see supra Part II.A. 
 181. See supra Part II.A. For a discussion of the possibility of using corporate charter revoca-
tion as a means of punishing and deterring corporate criminal behavior, see, for example, Mary 
Kreiner Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability: Containing the Machine 
Through the Corporate Death Penalty, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 933 (2005); Kyle Noonan, The Case for a 
Federal Corporate Charter Revocation Penalty, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 602 (2012). By contrast, 
our primary concern here is broader than criminal deterrence, as we focus on more fundamental 
state–corporation, or public–private, dynamics. We accordingly view charter revocation as a poten-
tial regulatory tool for achieving a broader range of public policy goals than criminal punishment 
and deterrence alone. 
 182. It is important to note here that not all legal and regulatory violations should carry with 
them a threat of charter revocation. It would be reasonable and practical to limit this ultimate penalty 
to sufficiently serious violations of those laws and regulations that are of particular public signifi-
cance in the context of each individual corporation’s business. In some situations, however, the 
trigger for charter termination could be a series of less serious offenses or a persistent pattern of 
regulatory compliance problems. 
 183. In fact, all fifty states have quo warranto statutes that empower state officials, such as 
attorneys general, to seek revocation of corporate charters for certain violations of law and abuse of 
corporate powers. Not surprisingly in light of current assumptions that corporations are “private” 
entities, these statutes are virtually never enforced in practice. In this sense, they are reminiscent of 
the ultra vires doctrine itself. See, e.g., Mitchell F. Crusto, Green Business: Should We Revoke Cor-
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rent regime, firms that get into serious legal trouble often do not survive 
as independent business entities, either because they are forced into 
bankruptcy or because they are acquired by another firm.184 Writing this 
result into the corporate charter does not seem quite so radical in this 
context. 
Of course, that raises a question whether the existing system should 
be tinkered with at all. What real difference would the explicit acknowl-
edgment of the conditional nature of access to the corporate form make? 
It could potentially make a tremendous difference, in at least two ways. 
The first, more immediately visible consequence of introducing 
conditionality into the corporate regime is that it would force corporate 
managers and shareholders to develop and publicly articulate a coherent 
understanding of their firms’ business goals, activities, and potential so-
cial functions. It is no coincidence that, after the latest financial crisis, 
bank regulators came to appreciate, in full, the importance of this type of 
contemplative exercise as a matter of good internal governance and risk 
management, especially at large firms.185 The fact that each corporation’s 
purposes are prospectively defined and periodically reconsidered may 
also make the process of corporate governance inherently more transpar-
ent, while at the same time opening new channels for holding corporate 
managers accountable for their decisions. 
The second, less immediately visible but potentially more momen-
tous, consequence of our proposed revisions to the existing regime of 
incorporation is that they would embody a paradigmatic shift in the way 
corporations are viewed. It is difficult to overestimate the significance of 
this attitudinal shift. Reintroducing and operationalizing the notion of 
“corporate franchise” would completely reverse the key presumption 
underlying the current regime of corporate law and governance: the pre-
                                                                                                                                     
porate Charters for Environmental Violations?, 63 LA. L. REV. 175, 186–91 (2003); Noonan, supra 
note 181, at 610. 
 184. Enron’s infamous failure in 2001 is a vivid example of how fast and painful this fate can 
be. See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron’s Collapse: The Overview; Enron 
Collapses as Suitor Cancels Plans for Merger, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/29/business/enron-s-collapse-the-overview-enron-collapses-as-
suitor-cancels-plans-for-merger.html. 
 185. One of the critical postcrisis reforms in U.S. financial sector regulation was the new re-
quirement for large, systemically-significant financial firms to prepare and file with the regulators 
so-called living wills, or plans for orderly liquidation of their businesses in the event of major dis-
tress. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 165(d), 124 Stat. 1376, 1423 (2010). While the practical efficacy of individual banking organiza-
tions’ “living wills” in the event of their failure remains subject to considerable doubt, their value as 
the mandatory exercise in institutional “soul-searching” and “housecleaning” is widely acknowl-
edged. 
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sumption that incorporation is an essentially prepolitical, extra-legal, and 
nearly natural right of private individuals with which the state cannot 
legitimately interfere except in certain rare cases. By contrast, our pro-
posed regime is fundamentally premised on the view of the corporation 
as a hybrid public–private entity to which the state, as the agent of the 
public, grants a set of extraordinary privileges, but only in exchange for 
promises to deliver certain public benefits. Even though the proposed 
conditions on corporate charters tentatively outlined above are relatively 
modest and largely leave the task of formulating specific corporate pur-
poses to firms themselves, their adoption would critically alter the broad-
er context in which private and public actors interact, and would poten-
tially reshape the outcomes of such interaction.186 
                                                            
 186. It is worth noting that our proposal’s overall game-changing potential significantly ex-
ceeds that of so-called benefit corporations, which have recently emerged as a preferred form of 
business organization for companies seeking to combine shareholder profit seeking with the pursuit 
of certain social or environmental goals. The concept of a benefit corporation was first put forth by a 
nonprofit organization known as B Lab in 2008. By early 2015, a total of thirty states had adopted 
some form of B Lab’s proposed model legislation providing for a benefit corporation charter. See J. 
Haskell Murray, Corporate Forms of Social Enterprise: Comparing the State Statutes (Jan. 15, 2015), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1988556. Several companies—e.g., 
Etsy, Patagonia, Ben & Jerry’s—have decided to reincorporate as benefit corporations. 
 Benefit corporations must have a stated corporate purpose of creating a general public benefit, 
which is broadly defined as a “material positive impact on the society or environment” and must be 
assessed against a third-party standard (i.e., certified). See Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, B 
LAB §§ 102, 201 (June 24, 2014), available at http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/ 
Model_Benefit_Corp_Legislation.pdf. Among other things, benefit corporations are required to 
publish “annual benefit reports” detailing their actions intended to produce material public benefits 
and to appoint an independent “benefit director” specifically charged with monitoring the company’s 
compliance with its stated public benefit purpose. Id. §§ 302, 401. The charter explicitly authorizes 
the corporation’s directors to consider the interests of a broad set of stakeholders in making business 
decisions. Id. § 301(a). Finally, the model legislation contemplates a new mechanism of “benefit 
enforcement proceedings” allowing any individual to sue the company or its directors for failing to 
pursue or create public benefits specified in its charter. Id. § 305(a). For detailed analyses of the 
nature and role of benefit corporations see, for example, Johnson, supra note 15; Dana Brakman 
Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681, 689–92 (2013); Mark J. 
Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007 
(2013); J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit 
Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
 The emergence and increasing acceptance of benefit corporations is a product of growing 
societal recognition of the need to reintegrate the public interest into the activities and regulation of 
private corporations. To a great extent, states’ willingness to adopt benefit corporation statutes re-
flects this ongoing shift in public consciousness. In this sense, benefit corporations provide a poten-
tially powerful counterargument to the likely criticism that this Article’s proposal is entirely unreal-
istic or unacceptably radical. Today’s benefit corporations seek to revive the early American view of 
business corporations as public-service entities. See Johnson, supra note 15, at 272. The very fact of 
such a return to early practices proves that the current ones are not the only possible “reality.” 
 At the same time, however, the existence of benefit corporations does not remove the need for 
a more fundamental reform of the general incorporation regime, along the lines envisioned in this 
Article. In contrast to the existing benefit corporation model, the approach outlined in this Article 
 
2016] “Special,” Vestigial, or Visionary? 495 
C. Potential Challenges and Difficulties 
Major attitudinal shifts, however, are not easy to accomplish. This 
may be especially true in the area of corporate law and practice, where 
entrenched economic interests, well-established legal concepts, and theo-
retical “truths” seem to constitute a formidable unified worldview. Our 
thought experiment would be incomplete without a brief word on the 
principal challenges and difficulties likely to arise on the path to any 
proposed alteration to that worldview. 
Generally, the very idea of asking private corporations to commit to 
any public purpose is likely to provoke hostile reactions from many cor-
porate law experts, strongly conditioned to associate “free incorporation” 
with economic efficiency, progress, and freedom. These critics will like-
ly claim that our arguments are not only wrong but also dangerous, and 
that bringing back the old era of “special chartering” will destroy the 
country’s capital markets and economic growth, drive job-creating busi-
nesses abroad, and unleash government corruption. 
Threats of such doomsday scenarios, however, would be misdi-
rected. For one thing, such threats sound in the very “capital scarcity” 
myths that we debunked above. For another thing, this Article does not 
advocate bringing back the old era of “special charters.” The proposal 
outlined here is deliberately modest; it is envisioned as an initial step 
toward a greater recognition of the public interest in the activities of pri-
vate corporations that enjoy publicly-granted privileges.187 Typical 
doomsday criticisms of such recognition seem for the most part to be 
mere products of unexamined assumptions about the nature and behavior 
of presumably privately-constituted corporations and markets. These as-
sumptions also prevent open-minded intellectual experimentation that 
can generate potential solutions to difficult real-life problems. 
                                                                                                                                     
would make the declaration of corporations’ public purposes both general and mandatory. By doing 
so, our proposal potentially overcomes some of the key weaknesses of the benefit corporation model, 
which is frequently criticized for being a potentially ineffective “branding” exercise. See Dana 
Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 591 (2011). Restoring the notion of public purpose to the very foundation of the corporate form 
removes the element of voluntariness and thus provides a stronger basis for institutionalizing corpo-
rate social responsibility. 
 187. The need for such recognition is evident in the growing popular frustration with the seem-
ingly uncontrolled growth and concentration of corporate power, not only as an economic but also as 
a political matter. See, e.g., MATT TAIBBI, THE DIVIDE: AMERICAN INJUSTICE IN THE AGE OF THE 
WEALTH GAP 141–96 (2014); George Monbiot, Taming Corporate Power: The Key Political Issue 
of Our Age, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/ 
dec/08/taming-corporate-power-key-political-issue-alternative. 
496 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 39:453 
As a practical matter, the proposal advanced in this Article in the 
spirit of such intellectual experimentation is likely to face three main im-
plementation challenges. 
First, any attempt to reintroduce explicit corporate conditionality is 
bound to raise significant political problems and generate serious politi-
cal opposition. Demanding private corporations to make an enforceable 
legal commitment to deliver certain public benefits could require rewir-
ing the entire system of corporate chartering and oversight as it currently 
stands, just as the current regime rewired the earlier, conditional incorpo-
ration regime. In the United States, both of these functions are performed 
primarily within the jurisdiction of individual states.188 Therefore, any 
significant reform of the current incorporation regime would require ei-
ther legislative amendments to each state’s existing corporate laws or the 
federalization of corporate law. 
This, of course, is a rather daunting prospect, given the vagaries of 
state politics in general and the well-known dynamics of the “race to the 
bottom” approach on the part of individual states seeking to increase 
their attractiveness to firms as a preferred place of incorporation.189 As 
Delaware remains the recognized leader in state competition for corpo-
rate charters, the willingness—or, conversely, unwillingness—of Dela-
ware lawmakers and jurists to accept the new paradigm of corporate pur-
pose would likely have a considerable impact on other states’ choices.190 
At present, it is difficult to see what factors could possibly move Dela-
ware, or any other state, to restrict the availability of currently “free in-
corporation” against the likely opposition from various powerful domes-
tic constituencies with vested interests. Accordingly, federalizing corpo-
rate chartering and corporate law may offer the only viable alternative to 
                                                            
 188. In the United States, private corporations are chartered by states, and the general rights 
and obligations of the corporate entity and its stakeholders are governed by state laws. Many 
state-chartered corporations are also subject to significant federal regulation with respect to their 
specific activities, such as workplace safety, environmental protections, taxation, and many others. 
Large, publicly traded corporations are explicitly subject to oversight by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. Nevertheless, for the purposes of the present discussion, the existence of this special-
ized federal regulatory overlay is not directly relevant. For a discussion of the history of federal 
intervention in corporate law, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: 
Lessons from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793 (2006). 
 189. For more on the dynamics of state charter competition see, for example, William L. Cary, 
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Ralph K. 
Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 251 (1977); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on 
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992). 
 190. See Bebchuk, supra note 189, at 1443 (“Delaware’s dominance of the state charter com-
petition has resulted in the widespread diffusion of its law.”). 
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dealing with the fifty states’ messy politics.191 As a practical matter, 
however, this is an equally politically-fraught proposition, given both 
traditional attachment to “federalism” and the deeply dysfunctional na-
ture of Congressional politics in recent years.192 
In addition to political challenges, a shift back toward the franchise 
view of the corporation is likely to raise potentially serious issues of ad-
ministrative and regulatory capacity. Imposing conditionality on corpo-
rate charters would immediately place a great deal of new responsibilities 
on chartering authorities.193 The government agencies overseeing incor-
poration would have to develop new procedures for processing charter 
applications and reviewing the newly mandated statements of business 
and public purpose. As discussed above, such review would inevitably 
require government officials to make potentially complex technical and 
normative judgments.194 Chartering agencies would also have to establish 
adequate procedural and substantive criteria for continuous monitoring 
and enforcement of corporations’ compliance with the conditions of their 
charters. 
In order to be able to fulfill these tasks, chartering agencies would 
likely need substantial increases in their budgets and human resources. 
They would have to hire knowledgeable people and spend funds to main-
tain and improve both institutional expertise and institutional integrity. 
Decades of ideologically-driven “government-bashing”—explicitly, in 
political debates, and implicitly, in academic discourse dominated by 
neoliberal orthodoxy—make this task particularly difficult. It is an open 
secret that government spending, especially for purposes of regulating 
economic activities, is a notoriously controversial political issue. At least 
as importantly, pursuing a career in government is generally viewed as 
an inferior choice for the country’s brightest and most talented people.195 
To the extent that the process of acquiring and maintaining corporate 
                                                            
 191. For a general discussion of federalization of corporate law, see, for example, Bebchuk & 
Hamdani, supra note 188. 
 192. It is worth remembering, however, that political winds are notoriously fickle, and political 
will to take certain action can materialize quite suddenly in response to particular triggering events 
or broader social or attitudinal change. In that sense, the fact that something appears politically un-
feasible today does not preclude it happening in the future. 
 193. Although we refer to government agencies in the plural, the factors discussed below 
would be equally applicable to a federal incorporation regime administered by a single federal agen-
cy. 
 194. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 195. See, e.g., John Thornhill, FT Lunch with Mariana Mazzucato: “You Always Need the 
State to Roar,” FIN. TIMES WEEKEND SUPPLEMENT, Aug. 15, 2015, at 3 (citing economist Mariana 
Mazzucato noting the fact that civil servants are often “depressed” as a result of being routinely, and 
unfairly, criticized as “enemies of enterprise”). 
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charters becomes more time-consuming and resource-intensive for cor-
porations, their managers and shareholders will inevitably (and vocally) 
accuse the relevant agencies of inefficient interference with “job crea-
tion,” “productivity,” and other forms of progress.196 These are typical 
claims in support of powerful, private groups’ lobbying efforts against 
increases in regulatory agencies’ budgets, and it would be naïve not to 
expect the same to happen with respect to the proposed changes in the 
general incorporation regime. 
These are all significant issues that would have to be carefully con-
sidered before any specific scheme of conditional incorporation is put in 
place. We do not pretend to have a clear solution to every potential prob-
lem of administrative efficiency and capacity. Yet, it is worth remember-
ing that these are not entirely novel or unique problems. Many federal 
regulatory agencies, including financial regulators, confront the very 
same challenges on a daily basis as they deal with technically complex, 
politically and economically high-stakes issues—often within very strict 
budgetary constraints. In this sense, the increased administrative com-
plexity of the incorporation regime should be properly viewed not as a 
proverbial “nail in the coffin” of the proposed vision but rather as part of 
a broader task of improving the design and functioning of the modern 
regulatory state.197 
                                                            
 196. As discussed above, the perceived inability of state legislatures and administrators to cope 
with the burden of entity-by-entity chartering was one of the factors driving the adoption of ul-
tra-general incorporation statues in late nineteenth-century America. See supra Part I.C. At the time, 
of course, nobody could predict the rise of the modern regulatory state capable of performing highly 
complex administrative functions. Yet, even today, those who oppose regulatory interventions in 
connection with various economic activities routinely base their arguments on an assumption—
effectively powerful because it is unquestioned—that government involvement, almost by definition, 
undermines some generalized notion of “efficiency” and is thus inimical to economic growth. For an 
in-depth discussion of why this is an inaccurate and socially harmful assumption, see Hockett & 
Omarova, supra note 25. 
 197. It is worth noting here that, in modern regulatory practice, there exists a rich body of 
potentially useful tools for helping government agencies to manage a large universe of regulated 
entities or activities. These regulatory tools can be creatively adapted to the task at hand. Thus, it 
might be necessary to implement a new regime of conditional incorporation in stages, and do so with 
varying intensity and speed, targeting initially only firms in certain industries of heightened pub-
lic-policy significance (e.g., telecommunications, transportation, energy, construction, etc.) or above 
a certain size. In addition, both substantive and procedural criteria for incorporation may have to be 
scaled accordingly so as to direct the regulatory energy to areas of the greatest public concern. It 
might even be desirable to exempt certain types of small, privately held corporations from some of 
the most burdensome requirements. All of these general techniques are frequently, and in large part 
successfully, used in today’s financial sector regulation. Their availability should not be discounted 
as a potential counterargument to generalized claims of administrative infeasibility of reforming the 
general incorporation regime. 
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Finally, in considering the return from the present “free incorpora-
tion” paradigm to an updated rendition of the original “corporate fran-
chise” paradigm, it is vital to explore the potential impact of this shift on 
the structure and operation of financial markets more broadly. For exam-
ple, if public-purpose conditions are actually imposed on corporate privi-
lege, would there be a mass exodus from equity investments to debt in-
vestments? If so, would that be problematic? How would such a shift in 
prevailing patterns of corporate finance affect overall economic growth? 
In this connection, it is also important to understand how this new corpo-
ration law regime would interact with other regulatory regimes that gov-
ern the activities of various corporate entities. For example, how does the 
encouragement of equity investment via corporate privilege compare to 
the encouragement of debt investment via tax write-offs under the cur-
rent Internal Revenue Code? If the former were to be removed, would it 
be best to also remove the latter, so as to avoid excessively stacking the 
deck in favor of debt investment?198 
These questions are especially difficult in view of the fact that to-
day’s financial markets are highly institutionalized and globalized. In-
deed, as noted above, these issues are most likely to figure prominently 
in the vast array of potential “doomsday” scenarios the most adamant 
critics are likely to paint in response to the proposal outlined in this Arti-
cle. Modern capital is highly mobile, and cross-border financial arbitrage 
often shapes the implementation of any state’s policies in unexpected 
ways. Against this backdrop, the role of retail mutual funds and 401(k) 
pension plans as massive institutional investors in debt and equity of 
both U.S. and foreign corporations gives even seemingly discrete issues 
of corporate law particular salience as a major socioeconomic policy 
matter. 
Answering all of these questions—and numerous others—would 
require a great deal of further research and empirical evidence. This 
Symposium Article did not seek to address these questions comprehen-
sively or completely. The goal of this Article was to start a conversation 
about the possibility of reclaiming the public’s right to demand its fair 
share of the benefits stemming from the corporate privileges that the 
public confers in the first place. The necessary first step in this direction 
is to redefine the terms of the debate and to reverse certain fundamental 
presumptions underlying the current status quo. The failure to take this 
                                                            
 198. A related set of questions arise with respect to whether the proposed change in the regime 
of incorporation would result in businesses abandoning corporate form in favor of some unincorpo-
rated form of business organization, and how that entity arbitrage would affect industrial organiza-
tion and structure. 
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step will ensure the continuation of a regime that has largely fulfilled its 
historical role and is increasingly incapable of meeting the challenges of 
the nation’s economic and political development in the twenty-first cen-
tury. 
CONCLUSION 
This Symposium Article began by posing a series of questions 
about the reasons for, and lessons that can be learned from, certain re-
markable similarities between the modern U.S. regulation of commercial 
banks, on the one hand, and what we called the original corporate settle-
ment that governed all American corporations until the end of the nine-
teenth century, on the other hand. In a spirit of open-minded intellectual 
exercise, we put forward and elaborated the hypothesis that these similar-
ities reflect a deep, constitutive structure of the business corporation as a 
hybrid public–private entity, best understood as a franchise arrangement 
between the state and the corporation’s private stakeholders. 
This franchise view of the corporation has potentially significant 
normative implications. It challenges the presently dominant and funda-
mentally antiregulatory assumption that the corporation is simply a mode 
of conducting purely private economic activities by private actors pursu-
ing purely private profits. By contrast, viewing every corporation—even 
the nonbank corporation—as an entity chartered by the public, with an 
explicit expectation that particularized public benefits will be received in 
exchange for the extraordinary privileges embedded in the corporate 
form, significantly expands our policy horizons. 
In this exploratory Article, we also started to map out some of the 
possibilities for restoring this basic public–private balance in the area of 
corporate law and policy. As a thought experiment, the Article undoubt-
edly raises many difficult questions and complex issues, all of which will 
require a great deal of further research and deliberation before our ideas 
are ready to be translated into practical recommendations. We look for-
ward to it all. 
 
